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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE 
SEVELOFF FIX? 
ANDY HARRINGTON* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court has not deprived Alaska Native 
Villages of a valid basis for claiming the authority to create and enforce their 
own tribal alcohol regulations. Every federally recognized Alaskan Native 
Village is situated in an area over which Congress extended the federal Indian 
liquor laws in 1873, in an enactment Congress has never repealed; this should 
logically empower Alaska Native Villages to exercise the same federally-
delegated authority within their federal Indian liquor law Indian country as 
lower-48 tribes have within their reservations or “dependent Indian 
communities.” Since this delegated authority is shared with the states, this 
postulate does not deprive the State of Alaska of any authority to enforce its 
own liquor laws; liquor transactions must conform to both state law and 
applicable tribal law. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Ways have to be found to provide communities with the power to create and 
enforce their own tribal alcohol regulations, ones that originate from the will 
of the people. Tribal authority, however, will not be feasible in light of the 
[Venetie] Court decision denying Alaska Natives tribal authority.”1 
 
Do Alaska Native Villages—as federally–recognized tribes—have 
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 1.  BERNARD SEGAL ET AL., CENTER FOR ALCOHOL AND ADDICTION STUDIES, 
INSTITUTE FOR CIRCUMPOLAR HEALTH STUDIES, ALASKA NATIVES COMBATING 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND RELATED VIOLENCE THROUGH SELF-HEALING: A REPORT FOR 
THE PEOPLE 70 (1999) [hereinafter ICHS Study], available at 
http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/instituteforcircumpolarhealthstudies/research/arc
hives/alcoholsubstances/alc-sub_afn_1999.pdf. 
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any authority to enact their own ordinances concerning alcohol within 
their communities? This question is significant because of the well-
documented deleterious effects alcohol abuse has had on Alaska’s 
Native communities.2 There are several respects in which Alaska Native 
villages might want to exercise alcohol authority beyond relying 
exclusively on state enforcement of state and local option laws.3 
This article posits that the answer is “yes”; Alaska Native Villages 
can enact their own rules and impose their own sanctions for violations 
of those rules. Such ordinances would not supplant, but rather 
supplement, existing state and local option alcohol laws.  
Part I reviews the argument that Alaska Native Villages lack such 
authority. Part II surveys the federal Indian liquor laws and their 
reformulation in 1953 away from their somewhat paternalistic origins 
into a more empowering federal delegation of authority to states and 
tribes. Part III analyzes how these laws were brought to Alaska, 
including the 1873 “Seveloff fix” and subsequent developments. Lastly, 
Part IV explores several implementation issues that could arise if, as this 
article posits, each federally recognized tribe in Alaska has a valid claim 
to occupying “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian liquor 
laws, providing a sufficient basis for enactment of tribal alcohol 
ordinances. 
I. THE ARGUMENT THAT ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES HAVE NO 
ALCOHOL AUTHORITY 
The ostensible barrier to recognizing federally-delegated intoxicant 
authority in Alaska Native Villages is that they do not occupy “Indian 
country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.4 The 1998 United States 
 
 2.  Several of the many studies and statistics documenting the extent of 
alcohol damage to Alaska Native Villages are well summarized in Ryan 
Fortson’s simultaneously published article “Advancing Tribal Court Criminal 
Jurisdiction in Alaska.” Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction 
in Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 94–100 (2015). This author is indebted to Mr. 
Fortson for letting him cross-reference that article. 
 3.  “Local option laws” are state statutes allowing Alaskan communities to 
hold an election on prohibiting the importation, sale, and/or possession under a 
specified menu of choices. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 04.11.491 (West 2014). Although 
several Alaska Native Villages and municipalities have availed themselves of 
this option, many have been “frustrated with the statute’s lack of effectiveness in 
deterring alcohol importation and use,” and have tried to “adopt more assertive 
means of enforcement.” Pat Hanley, Warrantless Searches for Alcohol by Native 
Alaskan Villages: A Permissible Exercise of Sovereign Rights or an Assault on Civil 
Liberties?, 14 Alaska L. Rev. 471, 472 (1997). 
 4.  “Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the 
term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits 
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Supreme Court ruling in Venetie v. State of Alaska5 held that former 
reservation lands conveyed under the 1971 Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA)6 did not fall within this definition. Because 
ANCSA had revoked Venetie’s reservation,7 and because there was no 
argument that its lands were an “allotment,”8 the sole question was 
whether it was a “dependent Indian community,” a phrase the Court 
had not interpreted before. It held that “dependent Indian community” 
lands would have to be set aside by the Federal Government for the use 
of Indians as Indian land, and under federal superintendence. 
Notwithstanding conveyance of those lands by the recipient ANCSA 
Village Corporation to the corresponding governmental tribal council 
for that village, the Court held that the set-aside and superintendence 
requirements were not met, so the lands did not qualify as Indian 
country over which the council could exercise taxation authority.  
Post-Venetie, courts have recognized that Alaska Native Villages 
retain inherent authority with respect to relations involving tribal 
members even though they do not occupy “Indian country.”9 However, 
the objectors note, this inherent authority framework cannot provide a 
basis for alcohol authority, because the United States Supreme Court has 
already stated that “Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent 
power to regulate in this area,” in the 1983 decision in Rice v. Rehner.10  
Tribes in the lower 48 are able to exercise alcohol authority because 
they are tribes to which Congress has delegated some measure of federal 
alcohol authority—but statutorily that delegation only has effect within 
“Indian country.”11  
 
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-
of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the 
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not 
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.” 18 
U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 5.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 532–34 
(1998). 
 6.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h) (2012). 
 7.  43 U.S.C. § 1618 (2012) (revoking all Alaska reservations except 
Metlakatla). 
 8.  Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527. 
 9.  See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Congress 
intended for Alaska Native Villages to retain governmental powers whether or 
not they occupy Indian country). 
 10.  Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983), discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 52–54. 
 11. Per federal statute: 
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Thus, the objectors posit, Rice v. Rehner took away the tribes’ 
inherent authority, and Venetie took away the “Indian country” within 
which the tribes’ federally-delegated authority might otherwise operate. 
As a result, there is no basis upon which Alaska Native Villages outside 
of Indian country can claim any authority over alcohol, whether 
inherent or federally-delegated.  
There may be more than one flaw to this syllogism, but the 
particular component on which this article focuses starts with the fact 
that “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws 
(“FILL” Indian country) is not the same as “Indian country” for general 
purposes (“full” Indian country), which is what the Supreme Court was 
interpreting in Venetie. The Indian commerce clause enables Congress to 
designate particular lands as “Indian country” for general purposes, or 
as “Indian country” for purposes solely of the federal Indian liquor 
laws, or neither, or both. This has been clear since at least 1876:  
In view of this changed condition, it would be strange, indeed, 
if the commercial power, lodged solely with Congress and 
unrestricted as it is by State lines, did not extend to the 
exclusion of spirituous liquors intended to corrupt the Indians, 
not only from existing Indian country, but from that which has 
ceased to be so, by reason of its cession to the United States. 
The power to define originally the ‘Indian country,’ within 
which the unlicensed introduction and sale of liquors were 
prohibited, necessarily includes that of enlarging the prohibited 
boundaries, whenever, in the opinion of Congress, the interests 
of Indian intercourse and trade will be best subserved.12 
Indeed, the current United States Code contains more than one 
definition of “Indian country.” In 1949, Congress prefaced the definition 
of “Indian country” in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 by adding the clause, “Except as 
otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title,” and those 
sections are part of the current federal Indian liquor laws. In twin 
passages in § 1154 and § 1156, Congress specified that “Indian country” 
for purposes of those laws would be somewhat different, generally 
 
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of this title, 
shall not apply within any area that is not Indian country, nor to any 
act or transaction within any area of Indian country provided such act 
or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in which 
such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by 
the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified 
by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register. 
18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012). 
 12.  United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876). 
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narrower than the § 1151 definition (by excluding “fee-patented lands in 
non-Indian communities or rights-of-way through Indian 
reservations”),13 but with an exception if there was “a treaty or statute 
extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.”14 Thus, § 1151 defers to § 1154 
and § 1156 if “Indian country” is being considered for purposes of the 
federal Indian liquor laws; but those two statutes in turn defer to a more 
specific treaty or statute extending the Indian liquor laws to a particular 
parcel of land if one exists, which can make that parcel “Indian country” 
for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws even though it may be fee-
patented land in a non-Indian community.  
As such, the concept of “Indian country” is not as monolithic as the 
above Rice v. Rehner/Venetie syllogism assumes it to be. A piece of land 
might not be “Indian country” for purposes of allowing a tribe to 
impose a tax as in Venetie, but nevertheless might be a piece of land to 
which Congress has extended the Indian liquor laws.  
It would be entirely feasible, then, for Congress to legislate an 
extension of the Indian liquor laws to certain areas in Alaska and thus 
give tribes the same authority over those areas as tribes in the lower 48 
have currently.  
And indeed Congress already has. The 1949 amendments were not 
the first occasion on which Congress bifurcated the concept of general 
Indian country from the concept of Indian country for purposes of 
Indian liquor laws. Congress did so in 1873, in an Alaska-specific piece 
of legislation this article refers to as the “Seveloff fix,” and it is the 
backdrop and subsequent history surrounding this enactment which 
needs to be analyzed.  
II. THE FEDERAL INDIAN LIQUOR LAWS OVER TIME 
To better understand the Alaska situation, it is necessary to 
summarize the origins and development of the federal Indian liquor 
laws. 
 
 13.  In situations where the § 1154 definition excludes lands encompassed 
within the § 1151 definition, it is appropriate to recognize tribal authority over 
the broader swath of lands under the § 1151 definition. See City of Timber Lake 
v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1993) (“By the express 
terms of §§ 1154(c), 1156, and 1151, the narrow definition of Indian country 
contained in §§ 1154(c) and 1156 applies only to the reach of those federal 
criminal liability statutes, and the broad definition in § 1151 applies to all other 
sections in the chapter”). The case does not speak to a situation where, as this 
article posits is the case in Alaska, the lands may fall outside the § 1151 
definition, but fall within the exception in § 1154(c) because there is “a treaty or 
statute extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.” 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012). 
 14.  18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1156 (2012). 
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Starting in colonial times and continuing through the birth of the 
United States, laws existed to prohibit the conveyance of liquor to 
Native Americans.15 The first such United States law was enacted in 
1802 in response to a verbal plea from an Indian Chief to President 
Jefferson.16 The most definitive and long-lived of these federal Indian 
liquor laws were originally enacted as sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 
Trade and Intercourse Act,17 the successors of which still remain in the 
current United States Code.18 
As originally enacted, both sections were limited to operating 
within “Indian country,” which had a specific definition in section 1 of 
the 1834 Act.19 
Debates ensued as to whether territories the United States acquired 
after 1834 were “west of the Mississippi and not within the States of 
Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory or Arkansas” within the 1834 
definition of “Indian country.” Typifying this was the case of United 
States v. Tom,20 in which Mr. Tom was indicted in Oregon for violating 
the liquor law provisions of the 1834 Act.21 Oregon had not been a 
territory in 1834, thus presenting the after-acquired territory issue.22 
 
 15.  Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 352 (1942). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1154(a)). Section 20 made it a five hundred dollar offense to supply 
liquor to an Indian within Indian country, and made it a three hundred dollar 
offense to bring liquor into Indian country (except for military liquor supplies). 
Id. Any liquor found could be destroyed by any person in the service of the 
United States or by “any Indian,” and the individual’s other goods, boats, 
packages, and peltries could be forfeited through a court action. Id. Section 21 
prohibited distilleries within the limits of Indian country. Id. 
 18.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154 (“Intoxicants dispensed in Indian country”), 1156 
(“Intoxicants dispensed unlawfully”), 3113 (2012) (“Liquor violations in Indian 
country”), 3488 (2012) (“Intoxicating liquor in Indian country as evidence of 
unlawful introduction”), 3669 (2012) (“Conveyances carrying liquor”); 25 U.S.C. 
§ 251 (2012) (“Setting up distillery”); 25 U.S.C. § 253 (“Wines for sacramental 
purposes”). 
 19.  Which read: 
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not 
within the States of Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory of 
Arkansas, and also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi 
river, and not within any State, to which the Indian title has not been 
extinguished, shall, for the purposes of the act, be taken and deemed to 
be the Indian country. 
Act of June 30, 1834, § 1. 
 20.  1 Or. 26 (Or. 1853). 
 21.  Id. at 26. 
 22.  At the time of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, Oregon was still 
governed under an 1818 joint occupation agreement between the United States 
and Britain. Id. at 27. Oregon did not become an American Territory until 1846, 
some twelve years after the 1834 Act had been passed. L. Harris, History of the 
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Further, an Oregon-specific Congressional Act in 1850 had extended the 
1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act over the Territory of Oregon “so 
far as [its provisions] may be applicable.”23 Thus, there were two issues: 
whether the 1834 Act applied through its own terms, and whether it 
applied through the 1850 Act.  
The three justices wrote three separate opinions, but the other two 
justices concurred in Chief Justice Williams’ statement that, “Oregon is 
generally supposed to be a part of the Indian country named in the act 
of Congress of June 30, 1834; but such is not the case.”24 They parted 
ways on interpreting the “so far as may be applicable” clause in that 
1850 Act; two decided that such language sufficed to make the liquor 
law provisions of the 1834 Act applicable within Oregon, one that it did 
not. Chief Justice Williams posited that the applicability of the Act 
should be adjudged by the criterion “whatever militates against the true 
interests of a white population is inapplicable,” but since sober Indians 
were in the true interests of the white population, the liquor laws should 
apply.25 Justice Olney rejected that test, instead asserting that the 
question should be whether any of the provisions of the 1834 Act 
conflicted with the rights which white men had been exercising prior to 
1850, “thus making the rights of the whites under existing laws the test 
of applicability,” and since white Oregonians had had the right of 
unrestricted traffic with Indians prior to 1850, the 1850 enactment 
should not override the white right to sell liquor to Indians.26 Justice 
McFadden, called upon to cast the deciding vote, thought the test should 
turn on actual conflicts with other laws;27 opining that the federal Indian 
liquor law provisions were “well suited to the state of affairs here,” he 
concluded that enforcement of the relevant provisions of the 1834 Act 
“would not be in contravention of any act of Congress, or in conflict 
with any of the laws of this territory,”28 and so agreed with the Chief 
Justice that the 1850 Act made them enforceable. 
Thus, although two of the three judges ruled that the 1850 Act 
should make the 1834 Act applicable to criminalize the sale of liquor to 
Indians in Oregon, all three agreed that the 1834 Act by itself did not 
encompass the later-acquired Territory of Oregon. 
That aspect of the Tom ruling was criticized in an opinion by then-
United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing: “The terms of the act 
 
Oregon Code, 1 OR. L. REV. 129, 130 (April 1922). 
 23.  Act of June 5, 1850, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 437. 
 24.  Tom, 1 Or. at 27. 
 25.  Id. at 27. 
 26.  Id. at 29 (Olney, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 27.  Id. at 30 (McFadden, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 28.  Id. 
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are: ‘All that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not 
within the States of Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory of Arkansas, 
and also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and 
not within any State, to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, 
shall, for the purposes of the act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian 
country.’ Why, I repeat, does not this description apply to Oregon with 
mathematical precision of certainty? Is not Oregon a ‘part of the United 
States, west of the Mississippi’?”29 
In 1862, Congress partially mooted this question, by amending the 
1834 Act so that certain liquor law provisions were applicable both 
inside and outside Indian country.30 In subsequent cases, the United 
States Supreme Court made it clear that the 1834 definition had 
sufficient “adaptability” to extend to territories acquired after 1834, 
undermining the principle premise of the Tom ruling.31 More 
contemporary scholarship has indicated that the legislative history of 
the 1834 Act reflected intent to cover lands of several tribes in the 
Northwest.32 But as we shall see, the Tom case, whether correctly 
decided or not, was to play a role in developments in Alaska.  
If the definition of “Indian country” occasioned litigation during 
the 1850’s, it became even more susceptible to arguments when it 
disappeared. When Congress codified its first several decades of 
legislation into the “Revised Statutes” of 1873,33 only certain parts of the 
 
 29.  Indians in Oregon, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 295–96 (1855). 
 30.  Prior to the amendment, section 20 forbade persons to “sell, exchange, 
give, barter, or dispose of any spirituous liquor or wine to an Indian (in the 
Indian country).” Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. In the amendment, the 
phrase “an Indian (in the Indian country)” was changed to “an Indian under the 
charge of an Indian superintendent or agent appointed by the United States,” so 
the crime of conveying liquor to an Indian no longer required a showing of 
“Indian country.” Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, § 1, 12 Stat. 338–39. A separate 
clause forbad persons to “introduce or attempt to introduce any spirituous 
liquor or wine into the Indian country,” and that remained unchanged, so a 
conviction for importation still contained Indian country as a required element. 
Id. 
 31.  See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 207 (1877); see also Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 
U.S. 556, 561 (1883) (“that definition now applies to all the country to which the 
Indian title has not been extinguished within the limits of the United States, . . . 
although much of it has been acquired since the passage of the act of 1834”). 
 32.  Including the Walla Wallas, the Chinooks, and the Clackamus – the very 
tribe the Tom decision indicated the 1834 Act did not cover. D. Niedermeyer, 
“The True Interests of a White Population”: the Alaska Indian Country Decisions of 
Judge Matthew P. Deady, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 195, 233–35 (1988). 
 33. The “Revised Statutes” was the first official codification of the laws in the 
then-sixteen volumes of the United States Statutes at Large. Congress created a 
commission to undertake the task in 1866. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 
74. Upon receiving the commission’s work product, Congress appointed a 
Congressional Committee to review the work and prepare a bill. Act of Mar. 3, 
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1834 Trade and Intercourse Act were included in those Revised Statutes. 
The federal Indian liquor laws (FILL), found in §§ 20 and 21 of the 1834 
Act, became §§ 2139, 2140 and 2141 of the Revised Statutes. These 
provisions still criminalized both importation of liquor into Indian 
country and conveyance of liquor to an Indian inside or outside of 
Indian country,34 furthermore maintaining a duty for any Indian within 
Indian country to take and destroy any liquor.35  
But the Revised Statutes omitted, and did not replace, the definition 
of “Indian country” from § 1 of the 1834 Act.36 Still, several other 
provisions of law in the Revised Statutes continued to reference “Indian 
country,” making it necessary for the courts to determine which areas 
were and were not encompassed. In the ensuing decades the courts 
made their determinations as best they could, using the 1834 definition 
as the starting point for those analyses, even though it was excluded 
from the Revised Statutes.37 
 
1873, ch. 241, 17 Stat. 579. The resulting “1873 Revised Statutes of the United 
States” was published February 22, 1875; however, numerous errors surfaced, 
leading to some corrections. See Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, § 3, 18 Stat. 316; Act 
of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19 Stat. 240. Eventually authorization was given for the 
publication of a corrected version of the entire Revised Statutes, resulting in the 
more accurate “Revised Statutes of 1878.” Congress subsequently amended the 
1877 Act to specify that the 1878 Revised Statutes would only be “prima facie” 
evidence of the law, which could be countered by reference directly to the 
Statutes at Large. Act of Mar. 9, 1878, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27. 
 34. Congress removed in 1862 the “Indian country” requirement from 
section 20 of the 1834 Act. See supra note 30. The 1875 Revised Statutes § 2139 
arguably may have put that back in, by adding “Every person, except an Indian, 
in the Indian country, who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any 
spirituous liquors or wine to any Indian under the charge of any Indian superin-
tendent or agent . . .” But the corrections Congress enacted in 1877 removed the 
clause “except an Indian, in the Indian country.” Act of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19 
Stat. 244. 
 35.  Revised Statutes § 2140, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27 (1878). The original section 20 
of the 1834 Act had provided “it shall moreover be lawful for any person, in the 
service of the Unites States, or for any Indian, to take and destroy any ardent 
spirits or wine found in the Indian country, excepting military supplies as 
mentioned in this section.” Act of June 30, 1834, § 20, 4 Stat. 732. An amendment 
in 1864 substituted “the duty” for “lawful” in that passage. It remained a duty in 
section 2140 of the Revised Statutes. 
 36. “In the Indian Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834 (4 Stat. at L. 729, chap. 
161), the first section defined the ‘Indian country’ for the purposes of that act. 
But this section was not reenacted in the Revised Statutes, and it was therefore 
repealed by § 5596, Rev. Stat.” Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 268–69 
(1913). 
 37. The Supreme Court remarked: 
Nevertheless, although the section of the act of 1834 containing the 
definition of that date has been repealed, it is not to be regarded as if it 
had never been adopted, but may be referred to in connection with the 
provisions of its original context which remain in force, and may be 
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Congress did not redefine “Indian country” by statute until 1948. 
Drawing upon the decades of case law in which the judiciary had 
developed the concept, Congress fashioned the three-part definition—
reservations, dependent Indian communities, allotments—noted 
above.38  
The following year, Congress amended that definition, bifurcating 
“Indian country” for purposes of the FILL from Indian country for other 
purposes and explicitly providing that the FILL definition should yield 
as to a particular parcel of land if there was a specific “treaty or statute 
extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.”39  
By 1949, federal enforcement of the FILL was faltering. Earlier in 
the twentieth century, as prohibition was gaining momentum, Congress 
had toughened certain FILL provisions,40 but in the aftermath of 
prohibition’s repeal, enthusiasm for enforcing the FILL waned as well.41  
 
considered in connection with the changes which have taken place in 
our situation, with a view of determining from time to time what must 
be regarded as Indian country, where it is spoken of in the statutes. It is 
an admitted rule in the interpretation of statutes that clauses which 
have been repealed may still be considered in construing the provisions 
that remain in force. 
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883). 
 38.  See supra note 4 (except that the twelve prefatory words were not part of 
the 1948 enactment, having been added in 1949); see FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW sec. 3.04[2][c], at 189–98 (Nell Jessup Newton 
ed., 2012) (discussing in depth Congress’s definition of “Indian Country”). The 
new definition was part of a systematic revision of the federal criminal code 
Congress undertook in 1948. Simultaneously, several portions of the FILL were 
brought from Title 25 (Indians) into Title 18 (Criminal). Sections 241, 250, 252 
and 254 of Title 25 were repealed, and essentially became new sections 1154 and 
1156 of Title 18. Left in Title 25 were two unrepealed sections, one prohibiting 
distilleries in Indian country, 25 U.S.C. § 251, and one creating an exception to 
allow sacramental wines within Indian country or reservations, 25 U.S.C. § 253. 
Prior to 1948, the FILL had been housed in Title 25 since Congress approved 
that title in 1926, Pub. L. No. 61-440, 44 Stat. 777, and Pub. L. 61-441, 44 Stat. 778, 
both enacted June 30, 1926. Prior to 1926 they were referred to by their Revised 
Statutes section numbers, 2139-2141. Other portions of the Revised Statutes had 
been recodified into a criminal code in 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 
1088-1159, but the federal Indian liquor laws were not encompassed in that 
recodification. 
 39.  Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §§ 25, 27–28, 63 Stat. 94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1154(c), 1156 (2012). See supra text accompanying notes 13–14. Still, as of 1948, 
the law prohibiting conveyance of alcohol to an Indian applied both inside and 
outside Indian country. 
 40.  In 1918 Congress had gone beyond the importation and sale 
prohibitions, to prohibit possession by itself within Indian country. Act of May 
25, 1918, 40 Stat. 561, 563 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 1156 (2012)). 
 41. S. REP. NO. 1423, 73rd Cong. (2d Sess. 1934): 
In a number of cases, in statutes authorizing the opening of certain 
parts of Indian reservations to sale, settlement, etc., Congress has 
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By the mid-twentieth century, objections mounted that the FILL 
seemed anachronistic, paternalistic, patronizing, and inconsistent with 
developing notions of civil rights and individual freedoms of Indians as 
citizens of the United States,42 and not in keeping with the general 
emphasis on assimilation that was starting to dominate the federal 
policy of that era.43 
In 1953, Congress responded to these concerns, not by repealing the 
FILL, but rather by truncating them in two respects. First, they would 
only have application in Indian country.44 Second, even in Indian 
country, they would not have any application to a liquor transaction as 
long as that transaction was performed in compliance with the laws of 
both the relevant state and the relevant tribe for that particular parcel of 
Indian country.45  
This inspired solution relieved the federal government of most of 
its enforcement burden, as the federal law would function only as a 
 
provided that the Indian liquor laws shall continue in force for certain 
periods, usually 25 years, or until otherwise provided by Congress . . . . 
During the first few years after the throwing open of such lands to sale 
and settlement, it has been considered advisable to have the special 
Indian liquor laws continued in force for the protection of the Indians. 
However, the proportion of white population has largely increased, 
towns of considerable size have grown up, and many of the inhabitants 
do not believe that they should be subject to the sweeping prohibitions 
governing Indian and Indian reservations. Since national prohibition 
has been repealed, many protests have been received against the 
enforcement of these laws in such areas. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to enforce the Indian prohibition laws in such areas. The 
present appropriation for this work is entirely inadequate to employ 
sufficient men to make the law effective. 
Id. (The bill supported by this report, H.R. 8662, to modify the operation of the 
Indian liquor laws on lands which were formerly Indian lands, was enacted as 
Pub. L. 73-478, 48 Stat. 1245.). 
 42.  “A law restricting only a certain race of people is, therefore, 
discriminatory and against the principles of this free country.” 99 Cong. Rec. 
A1978 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1953) (extension of remarks of Sen. Goldwater, 
presenting letter from Clarence Wesley, Chairman, San Carlos Apache Tribal 
Council, San Carlos, Arizona). 
 43.  “In his letter Mr. Wesley refutes the claims of those who think the 
Indians have not reached a place where they can assume their rightful place in 
our society, alongside their white brothers.” Id. 
 44.  18 U.S.C. § 1161 (“The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 
3669, of this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian 
country . . . .”). 
 45.  Id. (“[N]or to any act or transaction within any area of Indian country 
provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State 
in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by 
the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the 
Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register.”). 
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backup; it made Indian country subject to state alcohol laws, in keeping 
with the assimilative zeitgeist, and it gave the tribes the ability to enact 
their own ordinances, which could be more restrictive than state law but 
would not provide a shield against enforcement of state law.  
This newly shared-authority structure was challenged, first by non-
Indian bar owners resisting tribal authority. In United States v. Mazurie,46 
the owners of the Blue Bull Bar, situated on one of the substantial tracts 
of non-Indian-held land scattered within the Wind River Reservation, 
argued they had a right to operate that bar by reason of their license 
from the State of Wyoming and could not be required to also obtain a 
license from the Wind River Tribes.47 After about a year of operating 
without a tribal license, the owners were prosecuted and convicted 
under the FILL.48 They appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed, 
ruling that insofar as 18 U.S.C. § 1161 authorized Indian tribes to adopt 
ordinances controlling the introduction by non-Indians of alcohol onto 
non-Indian land, it was an invalid congressional attempt to delegate 
authority.49 The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that 
Congress could validly regulate such sales and could validly delegate its 
authority to the Tribe50: 
[W]hen Congress, delegated its authority to control the 
introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian country, it did 
so to entities which possess a certain degree of independent 
authority over matters that affect the internal and social 
relations of tribal life. Clearly the distribution and use of 
intoxicants is just such a matter. We need not decide whether 
this independent authority is itself sufficient for the tribes to 
impose Ordinance No. 26. It is necessary only to state that the 
independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect 
Congress’ decision to vest in tribal councils this portion of its 
own authority ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
tribes.’51 
A mirror-image challenge to state authority was resolved in Rice v. 
 
 46.  419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
 47.  See id. at 546–48 (discussing the owner of the Blue Bull’s situation). 
 48.  Id. at 548–49. 
 49.  Id. at 549–50. The owners raised other arguments as well: that the bar’s 
location on fee-patented land in a non-Indian community brought it within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1154 and thus outside Indian country for purposes of the 
FILL, and that the meaning of “non-Indian community” was unconstitutionally 
vague. The Tenth Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 550, 
552–53. 
 50.  Id. at 553–58. 
 51.   Id. at 557. 
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Rehner.52 A federally licensed trader operating a general store on an 
Indian reservation sought a declaratory judgment that she was not 
required to obtain a state liquor license to sell liquor there. Although the 
Ninth Circuit agreed, the Supreme Court did not. The assumption that 
States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation 
was “unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation of liquor.”53 
Under the 1953 law,  
It is clear then that Congress viewed § 1161 as abolishing 
federal prohibition, and as legalizing Indian liquor transactions 
as long as those transactions conformed both with tribal 
ordinance and state law. It is also clear that Congress 
contemplated that its absolute but not exclusive power to 
regulate Indian liquor transactions would be delegated to the 
tribes themselves, and to the States . . . .54 
Thus, the 1953 enactment was a valid delegation to states and 
tribes, each of which can impose their own restrictions on intoxicant 
transactions, and neither of which can claim to exercise such authority to 
the exclusion of the other. Notably, neither in Mazurie nor in Rice was 
the state suing the tribe or vice versa. Rather, in each case, a private 
business sought to escape one government’s regulation by arguing that 
the other government’s authority was exclusive. Each argument failed. 
If this works in the lower 48, it likely could work in Alaska. But we 
have not yet completely unraveled the Venetie/Rice syllogism. FILL 
Indian country can be created by Congressional extension of the FILL to 
a particular parcel of land, without making that land into “full” Indian 
country within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1151. But this only 
establishes that Congress has the authority to do so; it remains to be 
established that there was some point at which Congress extended the 
Indian liquor laws to Alaska. 
III. THE FEDERAL INDIAN LIQUOR LAWS IN ALASKA 
Alaska was acquired by the United States in 1867, at which point 
the federal Indian liquor laws were still housed in sections 20 and 21 of 
the 1834 Act.55 At that point, Indian country was still defined as lands 
 
 52.  463 U.S. 713 (1983). 
 53.   Id. at 723. It was in this context that the Court stated “there can be no 
doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate 
in the area.” Id. at 724. 
 54.   Id. at 728. 
 55.   As amended by the Acts of Feb. 13, 1862 and March 15, 1864, see supra 
notes 30, 35. Thus, portions of section 20 of the 1834 Act now applied to 
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“west of the Mississippi and not within the States of Missouri and 
Louisiana or the Territory or Arkansas.” Secretary of State William 
Seward and President Andrew Johnson had just acquired a large chunk 
of such lands,56 and Congress embarked on the task of deciding what 
laws would apply thereto. 
A. 1868: New Customs for Alaska 
In 1868, the first Congressional enactment concerning Alaska made 
the newly acquired land a customs collection district with no governor, 
no legislature, and no courts. Legal issues were to be addressed to the 
federal district courts of California, Oregon, or the Washington 
Territory.57 The 1868 law extended the federal laws “relating to customs, 
commerce, and navigation” to Alaska’s “mainland, islands and 
waters . . . so far as the same may be applicable thereto.”58 This logically 
encompassed the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, enacted pursuant to 
the Indian commerce clause.59 
 
providing liquor to Indians inside and outside Indian country. 
 56.  Treaty of Cession, June 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 539. 
 57.  Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, § 7, 15 Stat. 240. 
 58.  Id. § 1. 
 59.  Section 4 of the 1868 Act, 15 Stat. at 241, gave the President “power to 
restrict and regulate or to prohibit the importation and use of fire-arms, 
ammunition, and distilled spirits into and within the said territory.” President 
Andrew Johnson initially prohibited importation of all firearms, ammunition 
and liquor, except that the Secretary of the Treasury could prescribe regulations 
under which they could be sold “in limited quantities” and only “to such 
persons as the military or other chief authority in said Territory may specially 
designate in permits for that purpose.” JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3865 (1897). “Such persons” were 
limited to whites. Letter from Hugh McCulloch, Treasury Secretary, to Wm. S. 
Dodge, Special Agent and Acting Customs Collector at Sitka (Feb. 5, 1868) (on 
file with National Records Seattle, Records of U.S. Customs Service) (“Wines and 
distilled spirits, in limited quantities . . . may be transported from any port in the 
United States on the Pacific Coast, to the said port of Sitka, and to none other in 
the Territory aforesaid, for the purposes of sale to resident white citizens of said 
Territory. . . .”). President Grant kept in place the liquor prohibition. Larry 
Arthur Sparks, The Failure of Prohibition in Alaska: 1884-1900 12-13 (1974), available 
at http://www.skepticalthayne.com/prohibition.pdf. The understanding 
continued to be that liquor was absolutely prohibited to Natives, but not to 
whites. See Letter from William Kapus, Collector, to Vincent Colyer, Special U.S. 
Indian Comm’r, Sitka, Alaska (Oct. 25, 1869), in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 579 (1869) (“The liquors that were seized by me 
in the month of August from on board the steamship Active were sold at this 
port on the 14th instant, but were delivered to the purchasers only in limited 
quantities for the use of white inhabitants, and, as the law requires, upon the 
written permits of the general commanding the department.”). 
ARTICLE 2 - HARRINGTON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015 2:03 PM 
2015 THE SEVELOFF FIX 45 
Either under the 1834 geographical definition of Indian country,60 
or under the 1862 amendment removing the Indian country limitation 
for certain Indian liquor law offenses,61 or as a function of the 1868 Act 
extending the federal commerce laws to Alaska, the widespread 
assumption—both among the public and within governmental 
agencies—was that the terms of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act 
prohibited conveying alcohol to Alaska Natives. An April 1869 issue of 
the Alaska Times warned readers that “[t]he law against selling liquor to 
Indians in Alaska is very strict,” and “call[ed] the attention of the 
merchants of this Territory to the laws of Congress, conserning [sic] the 
safe [sic] of liquors to Indians . . . ,” setting out verbatim the Act of Feb. 
13, 1862 (amending the Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834).62 
Officials within the Departments of Treasury63 and State64 had 
concluded that Alaska was Indian country shortly after its acquisition. 
Secretary of State Seward, who had negotiated the original Treaty of 
Cession, expressed the same view.65 This certainly appeared to be the 
 
 60.  Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. See supra note 19. 
 61.  Congress had twice amended section 20 of the 1834 Act by the time 
Alaska was purchased. See supra notes 30, 35. 
 62.  ALASKA TIMES, April 30, 1869. 
 63.  Letter from W.A. Howard, Captain U.S.R. Marine, Special Agent 
Treasury Dep’t, to Honorable Hugh McCulloch, Sec’y of the Treasury, in 
RUSSIAN AMERICA, H.R. DOC. NO. 40-177, at 196 (2d Sess. 1868) [hereinafter 
RUSSIAN AMERICA] (“Until laws or regulations are perfected for the government 
of this territory I shall consider it as an Indian reservation, so far as liquors are 
concerned.”); see also Letter from Hiram Ketchum Jr., Custom-House, Port of 
Sitka and Dist. of Alaska, to Bvt. Maj. Gen. J.C. Davis, U.S. Army, commanding 
Dep’t of Alaska (Dec. 15, 1868), quoted in Letter from Ketchum to Treasury 
Secretary Hugh McCulloch (Dec. 15, 1868), in ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL, Vol. 
II, 338, 452–53 (1903) (stating a similar sentiment). 
 64.  Letter from E. Peshine Smith, Examiner, to Bureau of Claims (Sept. 5, 
1867), in RUSSIAN AMERICA, supra note 63, at 96 (“I think, therefore, that the new 
territory became a part of the Indian country on the 20th June last.”). 
 65.  The relevant portion of Seward’s letter reads as follows: 
I understand the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the case of Harrison vs. Cross, (16 Howard, 164-202), to declare . . . that 
upon the addition to the United States of new territory by conquest and 
cession, the acts regulating foreign commerce attach to and take effect 
within such territory ipso facto . . . I can see no reason for a 
discrimination in this respect between acts regulating foreign 
commerce and the laws regulating intercourse with the Indian 
tribes. . . . The act of June 30, 1834, (4 Stat., 729) defines the Indian 
country as, in part, ‘all that part of the United States west of the 
Mississippi and not within the States of Missouri and Louisiana, or the 
Territory of Arkansas.’ This, by a happy elasticity of expression, 
widening as our dominion widens, includes the territory ceded by 
Russia. 
Letter from Wm. H. Seward to the Sec’y of War (Jan. 30, 1869), quoted in WILLIAM 
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assumption of the Department of War.66 
This assumption, however, came to an abrupt end when the United 
States v. Seveloff67 case came before Oregon Federal District Court Judge 
Matthew Deady in 1872. 
B. 1872: Seveloff and a Brief History of Tom 
Ferueta Seveloff, a Sitka Creole, was arrested by military 
authorities in Sitka and subsequently indicted by an Oregon grand jury 
for introducing spirituous liquors into the Indian country (Sitka) and for 
giving liquor to “one John Doe,” an Indian residing at the Sitka Indian 
agency under the charge of the Indian Agent for Sitka.68 
Judge Deady, tasked with ruling on Seveloff’s demurrer that the 
1834 Act should not apply in Alaska, reviewed the three separate 
opinions in the Tom case of twenty years earlier,69 dismissed Attorney 
General Cushing’s critique, and adopted the view that the 1834 Act did 
not by itself extend to lands subsequently acquired by the United 
States.70 
However, where the Tom court had concluded that the subsequent 
1850 Oregon Act sufficed to extend the liquor law provisions to Oregon, 
Judge Deady decided that the analogous “extending” provision in 
section 1 of the 1868 Alaska Act did not extend the liquor law provisions 
to Alaska.71 Judge Deady acknowledged that the 1834 Act was a law 
relating to commerce: 
 
W. BELKNAP, U.S. WAR DEP’T, JURISDICTION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT OVER THE 
TERRITORY OF ALASKA, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 44-135 at 5 (1876) [hereinafter WAR 
JURISDICTION]. 
 66.  WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 22. “The opinion of the Attorney 
General [Cushing] . . . and the communication from the Secretary of State 
[Seward] to the Secretary of War, dated January 30, 1869, have heretofore been 
regarded as authority upon the points. . . .” Id. 
 67.  27 F. Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252). 
 68.  Id. at 1022; SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
214 (1994). Seveloff was apparently arrested on June 19, 1872 and sent to 
Portland on August 19, 1872. Message Of The President Of The United States, 
Communicating, In Answer To A Senate Resolution Of January 7, 1876, 
Information In Relation To Military Arrests In The Territory Of Alaska During 
The Past Five Years, S. Exec. Doc. No. 33, 44-1, at 3 (1st Sess. 1876) [hereinafter 
Military Arrests 1871–1876]. 
 69. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. at 1023. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Extending “the laws of the United States relating to customs, commerce 
and navigation” to Alaska, “so far as the same may be applicable thereto,” 
language that echoed that “so far as [its provisions] may be applicable” clause 
that Chief Justice Williams had found permitted application of the liquor law 
prohibitions to Oregon. Id. at 1024. 
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Unless, then, there is something in the circumstances of the 
case or in the act, from which it appears that congress did not 
intend to use the phrase, ‘laws relating to commerce,’ in an 
unqualified sense, it follows that the act of 1834 is in force in 
Alaska, as a regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes 
therein.72 
However, he also posited two circumstances that, by implication, 
persuaded him that Congress did not intend to use the term “laws 
relating to commerce” in an unqualified sense. First, he thought 
“commerce” should mean solely commerce with foreign nations and the 
several states, not commerce with Indian tribes.73 Second, he thought 
section four of the 1868 Alaska Act, giving the President the authority to 
deal with spirituous liquors, should be given a pre-emptive reading and 
govern the whole subject.74 He acknowledged that his legal conclusion 
might be at odds with the facts on the ground in Alaska (which he had 
not visited)75: “the territory of Alaska is not a part of ‘the Indian 
country,’ so declared by law, whatever it may be in fact.”76 
Judge Deady correctly noted that the separate count charging 
Seveloff with giving spirituous liquors to Indians did not depend on 
whether Alaska was Indian country or not.77 But he further stated that 
“[i]t has been so common a habit of congress upon the acquisition of 
territory to specially extend the laws of the United States over it, that an 
impression seems to prevail that without such action these laws would 
not affect territory acquired after their passage.”78 He let that prevailing 
impression control his decision, although simultaneously observing 
“[f]or my own part, I can see no good reason why any general law of the 
United States does not become in force at once, in any country acquired 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. This seems irreconcilable with the United States Supreme Court 
opinion in United States v. Halliday on the same federal Indian liquor laws: 
The act in question . . . is, we think, still more clearly entitled to be 
called a regulation of commerce. . . . The law before us professes to 
regulate traffic and intercourse with the Indian tribes. It manifestly 
does both. It relates to buying and selling and exchanging commodities, 
which is the essence of all commerce, and it regulates the intercourse 
between the citizens of the United States and those tribes, which is 
another branch of commerce, and a very important one. 
70 U.S. 407, 416–17 (1865). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Judge Deady did visit Alaska, but not until 1880. Niedermeyer, supra 
note 32, at 221. 
 76.  United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
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by it, without reference to the time of its passage.”79 
With the indictments dismissed, Seveloff was free to continue 
conveying as much liquor as he pleased to the Alaska natives without 
fear of prosecution. Judge Deady expressed reservations about his 
ruling: “I would not be understood as stating this conclusion without 
doubt. On the contrary, I have reached it with hesitation, and express it 
subject to correction.”80 Nonetheless, he thought it “safer to err . . . by 
declining jurisdiction than to accept it. If congress should think it 
desirable that this or any other provision of the Indian intercourse act 
should be in force in Alaska, it can so provide, beyond doubt.”81  
As it happened, Congress did think it desirable that sections 20 and 
21 of the 1834 Act should be in force in Alaska and did so provide, 
almost immediately. 
C. 1873: The Seveloff Fix, Or One Thing Leads to Another 
The Seveloff ruling alarmed the War Department82 and threw its 
policy into “complete confusion.”83 Three days after the decision, 
Brigadier General Canby wrote a letter asking that the Secretary of War 
press for legislation to remedy the situation.84 
Interior Secretary Delano endorsed this request and expressed in 
writing to Speaker of the House James Blaine that distilled liquors, 
manufactured in Alaska, were being sold to the Indian tribes to the 
Indians’ “great injury and demoralization.”85 Delano suggested 
amending the original 1868 Alaska Act by extending to Alaska the liquor 
law provisions of the 1834 non-intercourse act.86 
Congress quickly adopted Delano’s suggestion. Less than three 
months after the Seveloff decision,87 Congress explicitly made sections 21 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of the Interior, M-36975 at 18 (Jan. 11, 1993), 
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-36975.pdf. 
 83.  HARRING, supra note 68, at 214. 
 84.  WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 22 n.26. 
 85.  F. Rives et al., THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE: CONTAINING THE DEBATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD SESSION FORTY-SECOND CONGRESS; WITH AN APPENDIX, 
EMBRACING THE LAWS PASSED AT THAT SESSION 2023 (1873). 
 86.  Donald R. McCoy, The Special Indian Agency in Alaska 1873–1874: Its 
Origins and Operation, 25 PAC. HIST. REV. 355, 360 (Nov. 1956). Delano also 
requested that Congress provide for the appointment of an Indian Agent at 
$3,000 a year, to enforce this proposed legislation and perform other duties. 
Although Congress did not fund this, Delano appointed an agent nonetheless, 
until told he lacked authority to do so. Id. 
 87.  Seveloff was decided on December 10, 1872. The corrective legislation 
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and 22 of the 1834 Act applicable to Alaska. 
[S]ection one of an act entitled ‘An act to extend the laws of the 
United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation 
over the territory ceded to the United States by Russia, to 
establish a collection district therein, and for other purposes,’ 
approved July twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-
eight, be so amended as to read as follows: ‘That the laws of the 
United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation, 
and sections twenty and twenty-one of “An act to regulate 
trade and intercourse with Indian tribes and to preserve peace 
on the frontiers,” approved June thirtieth, eighteen hundred 
and thirty-four, be, and the same are hereby, extended to and 
over all the mainland, islands, and waters of the territory ceded 
to the United States by the Emperor of Russia, by treaty 
concluded at Washington on the thirtieth day of March, anno 
Domini eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, so far as the same 
may be applicable thereto.88 
This was the “Seveloff fix,” and with the enactment of this 
undramatic and perhaps overly punctilious language, the federal Indian 
liquor laws were extended throughout Alaska.  
This enactment sparked a lively discussion within the executive 
branch agencies as to whether Alaska had been made Indian country for 
all purposes or only for purposes of the FILL, as detailed in the 
following section. This distinction would determine whether other 
important provisions of the 1834 Act would apply within Alaska. The 
discussion resonates currently, as the courts eventually concluded that 
Congress had intended to recognize Alaska as Indian country only for 
liquor law purposes and not for general purposes. Giving effect to that 
Congressional intent today points the way for harmonizing the 
conclusion that Alaska Native Villages occupy Indian country solely for 
purposes of Indian liquor laws with the conclusion in Venetie that for the 
most part they do not occupy Indian country for general purposes.  
D. 1873-1876: Campbell’s Suits 
In response to questions posed by the Secretary of War, U.S. 
 
was passed on March 3, 1873. No arrests for liquor law violations had been 
made during that interval, although George Austin, arrested for “disposing of 
liquor to Indians” on December 6, 1872, was not released until January 20, 1873. 
Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 3. 
 88.  Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 530. 
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Attorney General Williams issued opinions on the new law.89 In his first 
opinion, Williams responded to the question “what is Indian country” 
by analogizing the 1873 Seveloff fix to the 1850 Act concerning Oregon 
and similar 1851 legislation concerning New Mexico and Utah, 
seemingly saying that within such territories “Indian country” would 
encompass all reservations and all Indian lands to which title had not 
been extinguished.90 War Secretary Belknap sent a more Alaska-specific 
inquiry in November 1873, asking whether the term “Indian country” 
embraced the Territory of Alaska, and also whether the War Department 
had authority to exercise control over the introduction of spirituous 
liquors into that Territory.91 Williams responded “My opinion, therefore, 
is that, as to this matter, Alaska is to be regarded as ‘Indian country,’ 
and that no spirituous liquors or wines can be introduced into that 
Territory without an order by the War Department for that purpose.”92 
With the Treasury Department’s cooperation,93 the War Department 
issued orders implementing enforcement of sections 20 and 21, on May 
 
 89.  As Oregon Chief Justice twenty years earlier, Williams had written one 
of the Tom decisions. 
 90. He said: 
I think it unquestionable, both as regards the region west of the 
Mississippi originally included within the limits of the Indian country 
by the act of 1834, and as regards the region formerly included within 
the Territories just mentioned, that all Indian reservations occupied by 
Indian tribes, and also all other districts so occupied to which the 
Indian title has not been extinguished, are Indian country within the 
meaning of the intercourse-laws, and remain (to a greater or less extent, 
according as they lie within a State or a Territory) subject to the 
provisions thereof. 
14 Op. Att’y. Gen. 290, at 6 (1873). He refrained from addressing questions about 
the status of lands that had been opened up for white settlement due to a 
pending United States Supreme Court case, planning to update the Secretary of 
War after that case was decided. However, an annotation to the opinion notes 
that the United States Supreme Court dismissed the case. Id. 
 91.  Id. at 327. 
 92.  Id. In June 1874, the Attorney General responded to another question 
from the Secretary of War, indicating that the Department of War had authority 
to permit the introduction of spirituous liquors or wines into Alaska, even when 
those were not for the use of officers or troops of the United States. Introduction 
of Spirituous Liquors or Wines in Alaska, 14 Op. Att’y. Gen. 401, 401 (1874). The 
Attorney General reasoned that the 1864 amendment gave the War Department 
broader discretion for allowing the importation. Id. at 401–02 (“It shall be a 
sufficient defense to any charge of introducing or attempting to introduce liquor 
to the Indian country, if it be proved to be done by order of the War Department 
or of any officer duly authorized thereto by the War Department.”). 
 93.  Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, in answer to, a Senate 
resolution of Mar. 15, 1876, transmitting the report of a special agent on the 
Territory of Alaska and the collection of the customs revenue therein, S. EXEC. 
DOC. NO. 44-37, at 9–10 (1st Sess. 1876). 
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16, 1874.94 
Captain Joseph Campbell took command of Sitka post on August 
17, 1874, and found five prisoners who had been arrested for Indian 
liquor law violations in June 1874.95 En route to his post, Campbell had 
been briefed by Brevet Major-General Jefferson Davis, who was 
commanding the Department of Columbia (Portland, Oregon) at the 
time.96 Davis warned Campbell against sending the prisoners to the 
Oregon courts because the Oregon courts and U.S. courts in Oregon 
would deny jurisdiction.97 Campbell expressed frustration that he was 
ordered to “proceed against” the detainees but not told how to do so, 
aside from Davis’ instructions not to send them for court proceedings.98 
Relying on the 69th article of war,99 Campbell continued to hold the 
detainees. Two of the five men took ill and died in the post hospital.100 
Campbell finally received authorization to release the remaining men on 
a type of military-fixed bail, “a measure I recommended myself, not 
seeing any other prospect of getting rid of the custody of these 
people.”101  
Nonetheless, Campbell continued to try to enforce the law as best 
he could, and (notwithstanding Davis’s directive) eventually started 
sending the new arrestees to Oregon for court proceedings. Campbell 
discovered that despite the Treasury Department’s promise to 
cooperate, its Wrangell deputy customs agent John Carr was part of the 
 
 94.  War Dep’t, Adjutant-Gens. Office, Gen. Orders No. 40 (May 16, 1874), 
included in WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 15–16. 
 95.  Letter from Capt. Joseph Campbell, Headquarters, Sitka, Alaska, to 
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Headquarters Dep’t of the Columbia (Jan. 20, 1876), 
quoted in  Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
 96.  Davis had been transferred from Alaska to New York in 1871. DONALD 
CRAIG MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN: THE STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES AND THEIR LAND 
1867–1959 51–52 (1997). In April of 1873, he was given command of the 
Department of the Columbia within the Division of the Pacific, in which position 
he presumably had his discussion with Captain Campbell. Id. In 1874, Davis was 
transferred again, to Omaha. Id. 
 97.  Letter from Capt. Joseph Campbell, Headquarters, Sitka, Alaska, to 
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Headquarters Dep’t of the Columbia (Jan. 20, 1876), 
quoted in Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 3. The basis for Davis’s 
directive is unclear. It is possible that Davis was thinking of Judge Deady’s 
rulings in Seveloff, perhaps unaware that the statute had been amended, perhaps 
just distrustful of the Oregon courts. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Any officer who presumes, without proper authority, to release any 
person committed to his charge, or suffers any person so committed to escape, 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Articles of War, SONS OF UNION 
VETERANS OF THE CIVIL WAR, http://suvcw.org/education/documents/articles 
.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (discussing Art. 81). 
 100.  Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
 101.  Id. at 3. 
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problem, having accepted a one hundred dollar bribe from Wrangell 
resident W. P. Wilson for allowing a lot of liquors from the bonded 
warehouse at Fort Wrangell to be taken to Wilson’s house.102 Captain 
Campbell dispatched Lieutenant Dyer to Wrangell to arrest Carr and 
gather witness statements.103 Carr was arrested in September, and he 
arrived in Sitka in October. Unfortunately, Dyer failed to send the 
witness statements by the same boat with the arrestees.104 Campbell was 
unable to get the witness statements in time for the October boat to 
Portland, and was unwilling to send Carr and the other detainees to 
Portland without the witness statements, as this “would be equivalent to 
liberating them.”105 Instead, Campbell elected to keep Carr in custody. 
Carr, unwilling to wait, had his attorneys file for habeas corpus. This 
brought the matter in front of Judge Deady, who ordered Carr be 
brought to Portland in December.106 
Carr’s argument was that section 23 of the 1834 Act, allowing the 
military to make arrests for violations of the Act, was not one of the 
sections extended to Alaska. Judge Deady disagreed:107 
Section 1 of the Alaska act of July 27, 1868 (15 Stat. 240), having 
been amended by the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat. 530), so as to 
extend over the territory of Alaska, sections 20 and 21 of the 
intercourse act of 1834, said territory, so far as the introduction 
and disposition of spirituous liquors is concerned, became 
what is known as ‘Indian Country;’ and the military force of 
the United States may be employed by the president for the 
arrest of persons found therein violating either of said sections. 
To accomplish this result it was not necessary for congress to 
extend section 23 of the intercourse act by name over Alaska. 
By force of its own terms that section applies to any territory of 
the United States declared by congress, either in terms or effect, 
to be ‘Indian Country’—that is, a country in which the 
intercourse between the whites and Indians is regulated and 
restrained by special acts of congress. So soon, then, as Alaska 
was made ‘Indian Country,’ so far as the introduction and use 
of spirituous liquors is concerned, section 23 of the act which 
authorizes the employment of military force became applicable 
 
 102.  See In re Carr, 5 F.Cas. 115, 116 (C.C. D. Or. 1875). See also note 125, infra. 
 103.  Letter from Captain Joseph B. Campbell, Headquarters, Sitka, Alaska, to 
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Headquarters Dep’t of the Columbia (Jan. 20, 1876), 
included in Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 3. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  In Re Carr, 5 F.Cas. at 115. 
 107.  See id. at 115–16. 
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to it, and in force therein. 108 
Judge Deady gave more credence to Carr’s second argument, that 
section 23 only allowed military detentions for five days, within which 
civil authorities had to remove the defendant for trial. Carr had 
languished for about ninety days, and thus was entitled to be 
discharged.109 However, Judge Deady took note of the witness affidavit 
that Lieutenant Dyer and Captain Campbell finally managed to retrieve 
from Wrangell, and ruled that Carr should be committed to answer the 
charge for violating section 20, with bail set at $2500.110 This made the 
successful habeas ruling something of a Pyrrhic victory for Carr. He 
should not have been held in custody, but still had to face the charge. 
That five-day limit was a major problem; there were no civil 
authorities to whom custody could be transferred reachable within five 
days of Sitka.111 Immediately after the Carr decision, Campbell’s new 
commanding officer General Howard requested through the War 
Department that Congress amend section 23’s five-day limit.112 This 
apparently was unsuccessful,113 but General Howard thereafter 
proposed an easier non-legislative solution. If Captain Campbell were to 
be appointed as the Indian agent for Alaska, then he would be able to 
take action as to liquor law violations independently of his military 
authority, circumventing the five-day limit as that applied only to 
military arrests.114 General Howard telegraphed the Division 
Headquarters in San Francisco on March 9, 1875: “According to 
instructions of General Halleck [September 6, 1867], commandant in 
Alaska is ex officio agent for Indian affairs. Please ask that this authority 
be sanctioned by Secretary of Interior. This will protect commandant 
 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 116. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. (citing to a prior, apparently unpublished decision in which 
Deady had held a defendant liable for false imprisonment when the defendant 
had arrested the plaintiff under section 23 and detained him more than five days 
before removal, “because he had no sufficient means wherewith to do 
otherwise, . . .”). 
 112.  Letter from the Sec’y of War communicating copy of a telegram from the 
commanding general of the military Dep’t of the Pac., in relation to the length of 
time of retention of military prisoners, under section 23, Act of Jan. 30, 1834, S. 
DOC. NO. 43-15 (2d Sess. 1877) (“Please ask for legislation extending the time so 
as to give reasonable time to bring prisoners to Portland and deliver to United 
States marshal. This action necessary to enable United States to execute 
requirements of sections 20 and 21.”). 
 113.  The five-day limit remained in the statute. Revised Statutes § 2151. 
 114.  “[N]o person, apprehended by military force as aforesaid, shall be 
detained longer than five days after the arrest and before the removal.” Act of 
June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, § 23 (1834) quoted in In Re Carr, 5 F.Cas. at 116. 
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against civil suits.”115 After extensive discussion among the Attorney 
General and the Departments of War and Interior about the 
permissibility of the arrangement, Interior finally agreed not to object, 
Secretary of War Belknap made the appointment official, and Captain 
Campbell became the Indian agent in Alaska on May 21.116 
Captain Campbell now had a strong hand, but he proceeded to 
overplay it. Perhaps due to his new-found status as Indian agent, or 
perhaps due to the Carr decision (ruling that section 23 arrest authority 
was impliedly encompassed in the 1873 extension of sections 20 and 21 
to Alaska), Campbell became convinced that Alaska was now Indian 
country for more purposes than just the federal Indian liquor laws. In 
July 1875, he issued General Order 96, announcing enforcement of 
several other Indian country provisions in addition to sections 20 and 
21.117 
Reaction was swift and generally unfavorable. Fifteen days after its 
issuance, the Portland Board of Trade wrote to War Secretary Belknap 
requesting that Order 96 be withdrawn as against the interest of trade 
and commerce with Oregon.118 About a month after the new rules, Sitka 
Customs House Collector M.P. Berry penned a report outlining the 
problems Campbell’s new rules imposed.119 In October, Indian Affairs 
Commissioner Smith, who had supported General Howard’s original 
request for Campbell’s Indian agent status, concluded that Alaska was 
Indian country only for purposes of sections 20 and 21, and that Captain 
Campbell had overstepped his authority.120 In November, the Judge 
Advocate General’s office reached a similar conclusion.121 
Campbell’s commanding officer Gen. Howard countermanded a 
portion of Order 96 and instructed Campbell not to enforce the licensing 
requirement for traders already doing business in Alaska, limiting its 
enforcement to new traders.122 Howard allowed enforcement of the 
remainder of Order 96, although he noted that he would be sending it to 
the War Department and the Indian Bureau for review.123 
Campbell vigorously defended his actions in November 1875. He 
explained that the Natives had learned from American soldiers how to 
 
 115.  Telegram from Howard to Division Headquarters (Mar. 9, 1875), 
included in WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 33. 
 116.  Id. at 33–38. 
 117.  Id. at 39–40. 
 118.  Id. at 38. 
 119.  Id. at 29. 
 120.  Id. at 44–45. 
 121.  Id. at 47–48. 
 122.  Id. at 42. 
 123.  Id. 
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construct and operate stills to create their own “hoochinoo”, and the 
restrictions he imposed on importing sugar and molasses (relying on his 
general Indian country authority) were intended to thwart these 
operations.124 Regarding the complaints from customs officials, he noted 
that Carr and others had participated in the liquor trade, and those 
customs officials not actively violating the law were lax about enforcing 
it.125 
Campbell’s position that Alaska was full Indian country was 
bolstered by an opinion rendered by the Assistant Adjutant to General 
Howard in December:  
I do not comprehend that fine, metaphysical vague reasoning 
which regards Alaska as Indian country in one case, but perhaps 
not in another case. If one desires to introduce liquor, it is 
Indian country; if he does not it is not Indian country, or 
doubtful. This method of reasoning calls to mind the interview 
between Hamlet and Polonius. Yonder cloud has the shape of a 
camel, weasel, or whale, depending on the medium through 
which it is seen. Alaska is Indian country, or not, according to 
the stand-point from which it is viewed. My opinion is that 
Alaska is Indian country, or that it is not Indian country. If it is 
Indian country for one purpose it is Indian country for all.126 
 
 124.  Id. at 30–31. Many shared Campbell’s molasses anxiety. For example, 
years later, the Chilkat Chief Chartrich conveyed a request that the sale of 
molasses in large quantities by Juneau traders to his tribe be stopped to cut off 
the supply from which hoochinoo was being made. Governor Swineford replied: 
I regret being compelled to say that the law places no restriction upon 
the sale of sugar and molasses to the natives, and that I am powerless in 
the premises. All I can do, at the most, is to prefer a request to the 
Juneau traders that they desist from making such trades, and leave 
them to heed the request or not, as they may see fit. 
Letter from Gov. A.P. Swineford to Lieutenant-Commander J.S. Newell (June 1, 
1887), in ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. II, 338, 388 (1903). 
 125.  WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 32 (“[T]he impression made upon me 
as to the zeal of the customs officials for the suppression of illegal trade is not 
very favorable. I was obliged to arrest the deputy collector, Carr, at Wrangel, last 
year, for violation of liquor-law and malfeasance in office in regard to the 
custody of seized property, and since then all kinds of rascality are being found 
out against him. The deputy collector, McKnight, at this place, encouraged 
violation of the law by purchasing liquor he knew was illegally sold. The 
customs officials are directed by the Hon. Secretary of the Treasury to assist the 
military in the execution of the non-intercourse laws, but they never, or rarely, 
actually do anything.”). 
 126.  Id. at 54. However, while asserting that “[t]he legality of [the orders 
issued by] Captain Campbell, . . . in my judgment cannot be questioned,” and 
that “I do not think [Captain Campbell] has exceeded his authority,” the 
Adjutant further opined that Campbell’s orders were “injudicious and unwise,” 
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While the debate simmered within and among the agencies of the 
Executive Branch, the howls from the outraged Portland Board of Trade 
reached the halls of Congress. In December 1875, Senator Sargent of 
California introduced a bill to repeal the Seveloff fix,127 notwithstanding 
the opposition of the War Department.128 
The debate within the military reached the desk of General 
Schofield, Commander of the Division of the Pacific. Schofield expressed 
his view that Campbell’s restrictions on trade within Alaska were “evil,” 
but referred the matter to the Secretary of the Department of War, 
recommending that Congress be encouraged to provide a government 
for the territory suited to its condition.129 Secretary Belknap had his 
adjutant prepare a brief appending the various opinions, complaints and 
correspondence, which he passed along to Congress in February 1876.130  
But Congress took no action. Senator Sargent’s bill to repeal the 
Seveloff fix (SB 87), which if enacted would have mooted the question of 
whether Captain Campbell had overstepped his authority by removing 
that authority completely, was reported back with a negative 
recommendation in May 1876, and further action postponed 
indefinitely.131 The Seveloff Fix had survived the first (and to date, the 
only) Congressional proposal to repeal it.  
Ultimately, it was Judge Deady who issued the definitive 
pronouncement on Captain Campbell’s authority and the “full vs. FILL” 
Indian country question. In 1876, he decided Waters v. Campbell, a civil 
case brought against Campbell for false imprisonment132  
Hugh Waters had been arrested for violations of the liquor laws 
about three weeks after Carr’s arrest, and may have been one of Carr’s 
associates.133 Waters was brought from Wrangell to Sitka, held in Sitka 
for about two months, and then sent to Portland for trial, where the U.S. 
Commissioner discharged him about four days after his arrival.134 
Waters subsequently sued Captain Campbell for false imprisonment. 
Campbell’s demurrer argued that Waters’ complaint failed to state a 
cause of action; the complaint identified Waters as a “trader,” from 
 
and he should be instructed to revoke them. Id. at 54–55. 
 127.  4 CONG. REC. 200 (1875). 
 128.  WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 21. 
 129.  Id. at 33, 56. 
 130.  Id. at 1. 
 131.  4 CONG. REC. 3043 (1876). 
  132.  29 F. Cas. 411 (C.C. D. Or. 1876) (No. 17,264) (Waters I). 
 133.  Waters was arrested October 24, 1874 according to Military Arrests, 
supra note 68, at 4. One of the opinions refers to Waters’ complaint alleging he 
was arrested September 18. Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas. 412 (C.C.D.Or. 1877) 
(No. 17,265) (Waters II). Carr was a witness for Waters, Id. at 412. 
 134.  Waters II, 29 F. Cas. at 412. 
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which Campbell argued the court should infer that Waters was trading 
with Indians, and since Waters failed to allege that he had a license to 
trade with Indians as required by § 2 of the 1834 Act, Captain Campbell 
was therefore authorized to arrest and detain him even crediting all the 
factual recitations in the complaint. 
Judge Deady sided with Waters: “Alaska is not ‘Indian country’ in 
the technical sense of that term any further than [C]ongress has made it 
so.”135 With the 1873 amendment having extended §§ 20 and 21 of the 
1834 Act to Alaska,  
said territory, so far as the introduction and disposition of 
spirituous liquors is concerned, was thereby made ‘Indian 
country.’ [But] Subject to this restriction, the country seems to 
be open to occupation and trade, even with Indians. The 
provisions of the [I]ntercourse [A]ct of 1834 (§ 2129 et seq. of 
the Revised Statutes) which prohibit trading with the Indians in 
the Indian country, except under a license from a 
superintendent or agent of Indian affairs, are local in their 
character; and not having been specially extended over Alaska, 
as §§ 20 and 21 aforesaid were, are, therefore, not in force 
there.136  
Thus, the facts alleged in the complaint did not establish that Campbell 
had the authority to arrest Waters, and Waters’ civil case could 
proceed.137 
Judge Deady’s opinion settled the debate. Alaska’s Native Villages 
were within Indian country for purposes of the FILL, but not Indian 
country for other purposes. Assuming the Seveloff fix has not been 
repealed, his opinion gave Alaska Native Villages a claim to occupying 
Indian country for liquor law purposes, but by itself does not provide 
“full” Indian country status for purposes beyond that.  
E. 1876: Indian Country Disappears But Judge Deady Salvages the 
Seveloff Fix 
By the time Waters v. Campbell was decided, the “Revised Statutes” 
 
 135.  Waters I, 29 F. Cas. at 411. 
 136.  Id. at 411-12. 
 137.  Campbell had authority to arrest Waters for violating section 20 or 21. 
But Waters’ arrest in the fall of 1874 predated Campbell’s May 1875 status as 
Indian agent, so was still subject to the five-day limit, thus shaving off only five 
of the 113 days Waters was detained. Waters II, 29 F. Cas. at 412. A jury 
eventually awarded Waters $3,500 against Captain Campbell, but this was 
reduced to $2,000 upon Campbell’s motion for new trial, heard by Supreme 
Court Justice Field and Judge Deady. Id. at 415. 
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were in place. As noted above, this was the juncture at which the 1834 
definition of Indian country disappeared.138  
A second wrinkle peculiar to Alaska was omission of the “Seveloff 
fix.” Section 1954 of the Revised Statutes contained § 1 of the 1868 
Alaska Act as it had originally been enacted (extending the “laws of the 
United States relating to customs, commerce and navigation” to Alaska), 
but did not include the 1873 amendment explicitly extending to Alaska 
§§ 20 and 21 of the 1834 Non-Intercourse Act. As such, it might seem 
that it too, like the general definition of Indian country, was effectively 
repealed by § 5966 of the Revised Statutes.139 
However, there was a proviso clause to the repealer, which Judge 
Deady analyzed in Waters I. He concluded that the omission of the 
Seveloff fix from the Revised Statutes had not repealed it: 
There is even some question whether said §§ 20 and 21 are in 
force there [in Alaska] since the enactment of the Revised 
Statutes. Chapter 3 of title 23 aforesaid, of the Revised Statutes, 
does not contain § 1 of Alaska act, as amended by the general 
appropriation act aforesaid, of March 3, 1873, but only as 
originally enacted, and therefore the provisions extending §§ 20 
and 21 of the Indian intercourse act over Alaska are not 
contained in the Revised Statutes. . . . By the first clause of this 
section [5966], the general appropriation act of March 3, 1873, 
including the clause extending §§ 20 and 21 aforesaid over 
Alaska, is repealed, because a portion of the same is embraced 
in § 1954 ‘of said revision.’ But the proviso to the section 
excepts from the operation of this clause ‘any provision of a 
private, local or temporary character’ contained in such 
appropriation act. The provision extending §§ 20 and 21 of the 
Indian intercourse act over Alaska is local in its character, and 
therefore not repealed by this repealing clause.’140 
Thus, notwithstanding the exclusion of this provision from the 
Revised Statutes, the 1873 extension to Alaska of sections 20 and 21 of 
the 1834 Act (by this point, §§ 2139, 2140 and 2141 of the Revised 
Statutes) was still good law and still applied to Alaska. The Seveloff fix 
had survived its omission from the Revised Statutes. 
 
 138.  See supra text and notes 33–37. 
 139.  See supra note 36. 
 140.  Waters I, 29 F. Cas. at 412. 
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F. 1882: In Pari Materia Versus Repeal by Implication, Round One 
In his 1882 decision in United States v. Stephens,141 Judge Deady 
considered how the 1873 Seveloff fix should fit together with § 4 of the 
original 1868 Alaska Act, which had given the president the power to 
restrict and regulate or to prohibit the importation and use of fire-arms, 
ammunition, and distilled spirits within the territory of Alaska.142 In so 
doing, he addressed an important question: when a new alcohol law 
was enacted without explanation of how it was to fit alongside existing 
alcohol laws, should the subsequent law be read in pari materia with the 
prior law, or be read to impliedly repeal the prior law?  
Judge Deady reasoned, “[p]robably the better conclusion is that the 
acts should be construed as in pari materia, and both have effect so far as 
possible.”143 Concluding that such a harmonized reading was possible, 
he adopted that construction.144  
G. 1884: The Alaska District Organic Act and Alaska’s First 
Prohibition 
In 1884, Congress enacted the Alaska District Organic Act, “[a]n act 
providing for a civil government for Alaska.”145 This Act (1) created the 
position of Governor, (2) established a district court with a judge, four 
commissioners, a court clerk, a district attorney, and a marshal, and (3) 
made Alaska a land district.146 It incorporated by reference the laws of 
the State of Oregon, “so far as the same may be applicable and not in 
conflict with the provisions of this act or the laws of the United 
States.”147 
Concerning liquor, § 14 of the 1884 Act specified that the provisions 
in the Revised Statutes concerning Alaska were to remain in effect, and 
further:  
[T]he importation, manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors 
in said district except for medicinal, mechanical and scientific 
purposes is hereby prohibited under the penalties which are 
provided in [§ 1955] of the Revised Statutes for the wrongful 
importation of distilled spirits. And the President of the United 
 
 141.  12 F. 52 (C.C. D. Or. 1882). 
 142.  Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, §4, 15 Stat. 240 (1868). 
 143.  Stephens, 12 F. at 54. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 [hereinafter Alaska District 
Organic Act]. 
 146.  Id. 
 147. Id. § 7. 
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States shall make such regulations as are necessary to carry out 
the provisions of this section.148 
Thus, from 1884 to 1899, in statute, Alaska was completely dry, 
except for “medicinal, mechanical or scientific” purposes. Importation, 
manufacture, and sale to Natives and non-Natives alike were equally 
proscribed. 
In practice, however, sales to Natives and sales to non-Natives 
were not treated equally. Sales to Natives were prosecuted; sales to non-
Natives were largely ignored.149 Alaska’s third governor Lyman Knapp 
noted in his October 1889 annual report that there had been thirteen 
indictments for furnishing intoxicating liquors to Indians,150 but:  
It is noticeable that in the list of offenses for which prosecutions 
were brought there is none for violations of the laws 
prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors to 
others than Indians, while it is a notorious fact that it is 
furnished, without restraint or concealment, in all the towns 
where there are white residents. Inquiries as to the reason 
elicited the reply that prosecution would be of no avail—that 
no jury in Alaska would convict for furnishing intoxicating 
 
 148.  Id. § 14. On February 26, 1885 President Arthur made such a regulation, 
ordering that no liquor could be landed in Alaska without a permit from 
customs, to be issued only upon evidence that the liquor was to be used solely 
for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific purposes, and further that no 
manufacturing or sales could occur except under a license issued by the 
Governor with those same restrictions. Treasury Circular No. 30, approved by 
President Arthur (Feb. 26, 1885), quoted in United States v. Nelson, 29 F. 202, 206–
207 (D. Alaska 1886). 
 149.  In 1885, Alaska’s second governor Alfred Swineford noted: 
If any serious effort has been to enforce the provisions of section 14 of 
the organic act, which prohibits the importation, manufacture, and sale 
of intoxicating liquors, the result of such effort is not discernable in the 
total or even partial absence of places where such liquors are openly 
sold. 
ALFRED SWINEFORD, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA TO THE SECRETARY OF THE 
INTERIOR 14–15 (1885). He expressed little optimism: 
The law in that regard is practically inoperative, and I do not believe 
that, with our extensive coast line, the utmost vigilance of the customs 
official can prevent liquors from finding their way in the 
Territory . . . but, though positive in the opinion that a stringent license 
system would be much preferable, I shall, nevertheless, do all in my 
power to enforce the law as I find it. 
Id. 
 150.  LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
1889 23 (1889). 
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liquor to white people.”151  
The following year Knapp bluntly stated: “The law prohibiting the 
manufacture of intoxicating liquors in the Territory is a dead letter, 
except in its application to the Indians.”152 
In the subsequent year, the District Attorney wrote an appendix to 
the Governor’s Report, to explain why he should not be blamed for this 
state of affairs: 
There are now, and for many years have been, within the 
Territory, two or three breweries manufacturing and selling 
beer for other purposes than those [medicinal, mechanical or 
scientific] prescribed by the statutes. There are also many 
persons openly engaged in selling intoxicating liquors contrary 
to law. These facts I have laid before each grand jury, advising 
them that it was their sworn duty to indict all such persons. Yet 
in every instance they not only have refused to indict, but have 
refused to hear any testimony on the subject whatever. Some of 
these grand juries have been composed of the best 
representative citizens of the Territory, yet the sentiment is so 
universally against the enforcement of the present liquor laws 
that no indictment can be had and no conviction secured except 
where the liquor has been sold or given to a Native. In the 
latter cases the sentiment of all the better classes of citizens is in 
favor of a rigid enforcement of the law.153 
 
 151.  Id. at 25. 
 152. LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
1890 6 (1890). 
 153.  LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
1891 43 (1891). Governor Knapp, although not disputing that the task was 
daunting, did criticize the district attorney for not trying a little harder. Noting 
in the 1892 report that the federal district court and the commissioners’ courts 
had tried sixty-one defendants charged with selling liquor to Indians, and no 
defendants had been charged with selling liquor to non-Indians, the governor 
was disinclined to believe that jurors would be so irresponsible “if an honest and 
vigorous effort were made, if prosecutions were brought and pushed to issue 
with the thoroughness which ought to characterize the actions of men intrusted 
[sic] with the responsibilities of office.” LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR 
OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1892 15–16 (1892). Gov. Knapp was not alone in 
his disappointment with the efforts of the district attorney; examiner Allan H. 
Dougall wrote to the Attorney General, “[t]here is no excuse why [the district 
attorney] allowed this iniquitous traffic to grow so and to gain such a foothold at 
Chilcat [sic] as it now has.” However, Dougall also acknowledged “[t]here is no 
use of relying upon finding indictments against [the bootleg dealers] before an 
Alaska grand jury.” Apparently Dougall’s suggestion was that the district 
attorney keep bringing lesser charges against them, in the hopes of “exhausting 
their ability to give bond.” Letter from Examiner Dougall to the Attorney 
General (July 25, 1892), included in ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. II 413 
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There were many reasons for the failure of the 1884 prohibition 
law.154 Certainly Alaska’s huge coastline, remote communities, and 
scarce enforcement resources played a role, as did tensions between the 
various officials of the civil government—the customs agents (given 
responsibility for preventing importation and reporting to the Secretary 
of the Treasury), the district attorney (responsible for prosecuting 
violators, reporting to the Attorney General), and the governor (given 
overall responsibility but little authority, reporting to the Secretary of 
the Interior). The major theme of this era was the fact that the Territory’s 
white citizens were unwilling to enforce any alcohol bans as to 
themselves, while willing to enforce the ban on sales to Natives. Alaska 
was de jure completely dry, but de facto adhering to the Indian liquor 
laws.  
Congress itself reinforced this in some respects, by treating Alaska 
as liquor law Indian country during this era. Starting in 1887, for 
example, Congress appropriated money for the hiring of Indian police 
“to be employed in maintaining order and prohibiting illegal traffic in 
liquor on the several Indian reservations, and within the Territory of 
Alaska.”155  
By 1899, Congress was ready to call Alaska’s first prohibition to an 
end. But in the meantime, dicta in some court opinions raised the issue 
of whether the 1884 Act should have been read to have repealed the 
Seveloff fix. 
H. 1886-1892: In Pari Materia Versus Repeal by Implication, Round 
Two 
Did the liquor provision of the 1884 District Organic Act repeal the 
1873 Seveloff fix? It certainly did not do so explicitly. Indeed, the Seveloff 
fix continued to play a key role in several post-1884 cases, each 
reiterating the Waters v. Campbell reasoning that the 1873 enactment 
demonstrated that Alaska was not full-fledged Indian country, but 
Indian country only for purposes of the FILL.156 
 
(1903). 
 154.  See generally LARRY ARTHUR SPARKS, THE FAILURE OF PROHIBITION IN 
ALASKA: 1884-1900 (1974), available at http://www.skepticalthayne.com/ 
prohibition.pdf. 
 155.  24 Stat. 463-64 (1867). Similar appropriations were continued as late as 
1918, 47 Stat. 677. 
 156.  See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 29 F. 202, 203 (D. Alaska 1886) (noting 
that the court had previously held that Alaska was considered Indian country 
only in section 1955 of the Act of July, 1868, sections 20 and 21 of the Intercourse 
Act of 1834, and section 14 of the Act of May, 1884); Kie v. United States, 27 F. 
351, 352–53 (C.C. D. Or. 1886) (“Alaska is not to be considered ‘Indian country,’ 
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In 1886, however, the opinion in United States v. Nelson, raised the 
possibility that § 14 of the Alaska District Organic Act may have 
impliedly repealed the Seveloff fix.157 Nelson was prosecuted for violating 
the liquor law prohibition in § 14 of the 1884 Act. The opponents of the 
1884 Act made his defense something of a test case, as he argued that § 
14 was unconstitutional, and violated the fundamental principles of free 
government because “Congress, in its peculiar relation to Alaska, and 
with the restricted power it possesses in regard thereto, has no 
constitutional right to enact a prohibitory liquor law for this territory.”158 
Most of Alaska District Court Judge Dawson’s opinion in Nelson 
refuted that premise with a lengthy discussion of Congressional 
authority over newly acquired territory, concluding that the defendants 
could be convicted and punished under § 14 of the 1886 enactment.159  
Judge Dawson briefly discussed fitting together the three existing 
liquor laws (which he enumerated as section 4 of the 1868 Alaska Act, 
section 1 of the 1868 Act as amended by the 1873 Seveloff fix, and section 
14 of the 1884 District Organic Act).160 Portions of this discussion reflect 
an assumption that the later act should repeal its predecessors,161 but 
other portions reflect a preference for reading the statutes in pari 
materia.162 Ultimately, since the arguments before him did not concern 
 
only so far as concerns the introduction and disposition of spirituous liquors 
therein.”); In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 328 (D. Alaska 1886) (“Only as to the 
prohibited commerce mentioned in the sections referred to, can Alaska be 
regarded as Indian country.”). 
 157.  Nelson, 29 F. at 206. 
 158.  Id. at 203. Governor Swineford mentioned the Nelson case, albeit not by 
name, in his 1885 report, noting that several indictments for liquor trafficking 
had been brought, and the defendants all combined to focus their efforts on one 
test case (Nelson) in which it was argued that the law was void and 
unenforceable. The district court had overruled the demurrer, and the defendant 
had taken the case up on writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District of 
Oregon, where the matter remained at the time Swineford wrote his report. 
Notwithstanding the trial court’s decision, “[i]n the meantime there is no 
diminution in the quantity of liquors being smuggled into the Territory, nor in 
the number of places where it is openly sold.” ALFRED SWINEFORD, REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNOR OF ALASKA TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 46 (1886).Governor 
Swineford advocated for the repeal of section 14, to be replaced by a strictly 
regulated licensing system. Id. 
 159.  See generally Nelson, 29 F. at 202-06. 
 160.  Nelson, 29 F. at 206. 
 161.  Id. (“[W]e may reasonably conclude that section 14 of the act of May, 
1884, was intended to cover the whole of the subject embraced in sections 20 and 
21 of the intercourse laws of 1834, as extended to and made applicable to 
Alaska.”). 
 162.  Id. at 206–07 (“It should be borne in mind that the various acts of 
congress in relation to the subject now under consideration are in pari materia, all 
relating to the same subject-matter, and are to be taken and examined together, 
in order to ascertain the legislative intent”). 
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the legislation from 1868 or 1873, any pronouncements on those laws 
were no more than dicta.163  
Nelson went up on writ of error to the Circuit Court before Judge 
Deady, who upheld Judge Dawson’s conclusion as to Congressional 
authority. Judge Deady also wrote that, as § 14 covered the whole 
ground, the most reasonable conclusion would be that it superseded 
prior liquor laws.164 He also wrote, however, that “no particular 
question was made on the argument as to the scope and effect of the 
act,”165 thereby explicitly acknowledging what can only be inferred from 
Judge Dawson’s opinion, that this was not an issue before the court. 
United States v. Warwick166 repeated this dicta, although it was no 
more necessary to a ruling in that case than it had been in Nelson. 
Warwick had been indicted for selling liquor to two Natives, under 
Oregon Code § 669 (which the prosecutor presumably felt applied in 
Alaska through § 7 of the 1884 Act). The defendant’s argument was that 
§ 669 had no application in Alaska since § 14 of the Organic Act fully 
covered the subject.167 Judge Truitt essentially ruled that the indictment 
was valid because, either way, there was an enforceable law prohibiting 
the defendants’ actions. He did note that Judge Deady stated that the 
1884 Act had repealed prior alcohol laws “at least as to the portions in 
conflict or subject fully covered by the later law.”168 But he nonetheless 
 
 163.  Judge Dawson elsewhere expressed caution about reading too much 
into the 1884 Act: 
It is lamentably true that the act of Congress of May 17, 1884, known as 
the ‘Organic Act,’ establishing a civil government for Alaska, is 
unsurpassed for uncertainty. The context and the whole body of the act 
indicate a want of that consideration which should always characterize 
an act of Congress establishing a civil government for the people 
inhabiting newly acquired territory. In the annals of American 
legislation, this act stands glaringly and conspicuously forth as a 
stupendous piece of stupidity. It is, indeed, difficult for the court to sift 
from its incongruous and ambiguous provisions anything that is 
tangible to the common sense of mankind in relation to this question. 
Myers v. Swineford, 1 Alaska 10, 12 (D. Alaska 1888). Indeed, about two weeks 
after Nelson, in a separate case unreported except in the local newspaper, Judge 
Dawson originally indicated he was inclined to rule that the provisions in the 
1868 Act authorizing the President to prohibit arms and ammunition had been 
impliedly repealed by § 14 of the 1884 Act (as he had stated in dicta in Nelson, 29 
F. at 206), but after taking the matter under advisement overnight, concluded 
that his original impression was incorrect and there was no implied repeal. The 
Alaskan (Sitka), Vol I, No. 47, Saturday Sep. 25, 1886, p.2. 
 164.  Nelson v. United States, 30 F. 112, 116 (C.C. D. Or. 1887). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  51 F. 280 (D. Alaska 1892). 
 167.  Id. at 280. 
 168.  Id. at 281. The 1884 Act had no provision corresponding to the passage 
in FILL giving the authority to (or imposing a duty on) an Indian or federal 
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held the indictment valid: even if the defense argument about the 
inapplicability of § 669 was accepted, the sale of liquor was still illegal 
under the 1884 Act, regardless of whether the vendee was a white man 
or an Indian,” and the language in the indictment that the buyers were 
Indian women would be taken as descriptive, or surplusage.169 As in 
Nelson itself, there was no issue or argument in Warwick over whether a 
prosecution might have been brought under the 1873 Act, so any 
pronouncements on that question were dicta.170 
Had the issue been presented to the court, presumably whichever 
side argued for an in pari materia interpretation would have pointed out 
the rule disfavoring repeal by implication, which was as well-
established a canon of construction in that era as it is today.171 
Still, those passages from Nelson and Warwick, even as dicta, might 
have left the Seveloff fix in something of a limbo. As discussed in the next 
section, the liquor prohibition in § 14 of the Organic Act was repealed 
before the turn of the century. In fact, of the three statutes Judge Dawson 
listed in his Nelson opinion, two were explicitly repealed, leaving the 
Seveloff fix as the sole survivor.  
I. 1899: The Explicit Repeal of the Implied Repealer, the End of the 
First Prohibition, and the Era of the High License 
These repeals were a small part of a much larger effort to provide 
Alaska with its own criminal and civil codes. Up to now, Oregon’s laws 
had largely applied through the one-sentence invocation in the 1884 
Act.172 The new criminal code (enacted in 1899) and the new civil code 
(1900) were largely derived from the existing Oregon codes, but would 
now be Alaska’s own.173 The repeal of the liquor prohibition in § 14 of 
 
official to destroy liquor, so even if there had been an implied repeal of some 
provisions of the earlier law, that particular component was neither in conflict 
with nor fully covered by the later law. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See also In re Moore, 66 F. 947, 952 (D. Alaska 1895). 
 171.  “A repeal by implication is not favored. The leaning of the courts is 
against the doctrine, if it be possible to reconcile the two acts of the Legislature 
together.” McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. 459, 470–71 (1862) (citations omitted). 
It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored; and 
where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and are 
not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court—no purpose to 
repeal being clearly expressed or indicated—is, if possible, to give effect 
to both. 
United States v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136, 147 (1895). 
 172.  Alaska District Organic Act, ch. 53, §7, 23 Stat. 24, 25–26. See supra text 
accompanying note 147. 
 173.  See generally F. Brown, The Sources of the Alaska and Oregon Codes, Part II, 
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the 1884 Act, effectively ending race-neutral prohibition in Alaska, was 
one of the most hotly debated aspects of the bills creating the new 
codes.174  
In the end, the 1899 enactment explicitly repealed Section 1955 of 
the Revised Statutes (derived from § 4 of the 1868 Act) and the liquor 
prohibition in § 14 of the 1884 Act.175 Under Nelson’s in pari materia 
reading, then, Congress, by repealing the formerly pre-eminent § 14 of 
the 1884 Act, as well § 4 of the 1868 Act, left the 1873 Seveloff fix in place 
as the last statute standing. Even assuming arguendo that § 14 of the 1884 
Act had by implication repealed the Seveloff fix, the repeal effectively 
reinstated it. At common law, the repeal of a statute which had repealed 
a prior statute reinstated the prior statute.176 
The common law was applicable to Alaska as of 1899 on two 
counts. First, Congress as part of the 1884 Act had incorporated the 
general laws of the State of Oregon to be the laws of the District of 
 
2 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 87 (1973). 
 174.  See id. at 93, 96, 101–02. 
 175.  “Section nineteen hundred and fifty-five of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States, and all that part of section fourteen of ‘An Act providing a civil 
government for Alaska,’ approved May seventeenth, eighteen hundred and 
eighty-four, after the word ‘provided,’ is hereby repealed.” Act of Mar. 3, 1899, 
ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274 [hereafter “Carter Code”]. Recall that section 14 
of the 1884 Act had read, 
That the provisions of chapter 3, tit. 23, of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States, relating to the unorganized territory of Alaska, shall 
remain in full force, except as herein specially otherwise provided; and 
the importation, manufacture, and sale of intoxicating liquors in said 
district, except for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific purposes, is 
hereby prohibited, under the penalties which are provided in section 
1955 of the Revised Statutes for the wrongful importation of distilled 
spirits. And the president of the United States shall make such 
regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. 
Alaska District Organic Act § 14. Although there are two appearances of the 
word “provided,” the intent of the legislation was clearly to eliminate the former 
broad prohibition on liquor acquisition by all ethnicities, so the deletion was to 
follow the first “provided.” See Brown, supra note 173, at 93, 101. 
 176.  “Under the common law rules of interpretation, the repeal of a repealing 
statute revives the original enactment where such repeal is accomplished by 
express provision.” 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23:32 (7th ed.). 
Most states have statutorily reversed that rule: “[t]he majority of the jurisdictions 
in the United States have enacted general interpretive provisions to the effect 
that the repeal of a repealing statute does not revive the original statute.” Id. 
Alaska eventually did so, but not until 1955. SLA First Extraordinary Session 
1955, ch. 4. This added to what was then ACLA 1949 § 19-1-1, the sentence 
“When any act repealing a former act, section, or provision shall be itself 
repealed, such repeal shall not be construed to revive such former act, section, or 
provision unless it shall be expressly so provided.” This subsequently became 
ALASKA STAT. § 01.010.100(c) (2012). 
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Alaska,177 and Oregon had accepted the common law as far back as 
1844.178 Second, Congress itself, in the same 1899 legislation which 
repealed § 1955 of the Revised Statutes and the liquor provisions of § 14 
of the 1884 organic act, explicitly made the common law applicable in 
Alaska.179 
Thus, whatever the tension imposed on the Seveloff Fix by § 14 of 
the 1884 Act, the 1899 legislation resolved that. The Seveloff Fix had 
survived the 1884 District Organic Act. 
Beyond that, Congress simultaneously included in the new code an 
Alaska version of an Oregon statute prohibiting sales of alcohol to 
Natives.  
Section 142 of what became known as Alaska’s “Carter Code,”180 
made it a crime, punishable by two to six months incarceration or a fine 
of $100 to $500, to “sell, barter or give to any Indian or half-breed who 
lives and associates with Indians any firearms or ammunition therefore 
whatever, or any spirituous, malt, or vinous liquor,” without the 
authority of the United States or some authorized officer thereof.181 This 
was imported from the Laws of Oregon, which had had some version of 
this prohibition since 1843, and which had had this specific provision 
since 1864 when it was enacted as part of Oregon’s “Deady Code.”182 
 
 177.  Alaska District Organic Act § 7. 
 178.  Brown, supra note 173, at 98–99 n.51. 
 179.  Id. at 97–100. As Brown relates, the criminal provision was enacted in 
1899, and a parallel provision receiving the common law was included in the 
civil code enactment Congress adopted the following year. Act of June 6, 1900, 
ch. 786, § 367, 31 Stat. 321. The two reception provisions (with minor 
amendments) remained in Alaska’s codes until statehood. ACLA 1949 §§ 2-1-2, 
65-1-3 (1949, Supp. 1959). Following statehood, they were combined into a 
unitary reception statute, still found at ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.010 (2012). 
 180.  Named for Montana Senator Thomas H. Carter, who played a 
significant role in getting the criminal and civil codes drafted and enacted. See 
Brown, supra note 173, at 92, 94–95, 102–103. 
 181.  Carter Code, ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274. 
 182. A prohibition on the sale of liquor to Indians was enacted by Oregon’s 
“provisional” legislature in 1843, based on the parallel provision of the Iowa 
Code as of 1838-39, part of what became known as Oregon’s “Little Blue Book,” 
and also enacted by Oregon’s territorial legislature in 1849, based on the revised 
laws of Iowa of 1843, part of what became known as Oregon’s “Big Blue Book.” 
See L. Harris, History of the Oregon Code, 1 ORE. L. REV. 129, 136, 187 (1922); A. 
Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 23 ORE. L. REV. 22, 33 (1943). 
A comprehensive recodification was undertaken by Matthew Deady and 
enacted by the legislature in 1864 (Laws Oregon, Oct. 19, 1864). Harris, supra, at 
200–215; Beardsley, supra, at 49–55. This included an updated prohibition on 
selling liquor to Indians, in the Deady Code of 1864 at § 654. Subsequent 
compilations became known as the “Deady and [Lafayette] Lane” Laws of 1872 
(in which the Indian prohibition was in § 669); and Hill’s Annotated Laws of 
Oregon of 1887, and second edition of 1892 (in both of which the Indian 
prohibition was in § 1891). See Harris, supra, at 207; Beardsley, supra, at 53–54. 
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The final sentence of Carter Criminal Code § 142 repealed the full-
scale prohibition provision of § 7 the 1884 Alaska District Organic Act,183 
thereby loosening the alcohol regime in Alaska for sales to non-Indians. 
This liberalization was the one of most controversial provisions in the 
bill, as the growing prohibitionist movement saw this change as a step in 
the wrong direction.184 
Opponents argued that repealing R.S. 1955 and § 14 of the 1884 Act 
provision would, aside from the ban on conveyance to Indians, leave 
alcohol within Alaska completely unregulated.185 A compromise “high 
license” provision was proposed, setting substantial license fees for 
alcohol businesses, and including a “local option” provision.186 The 
compromise was eventually agreed to187 and the bill passed.188 
This 1899 compromise, while repealing § 14 of the 1884 enactment’s 
outright ban, maintained a general rule that alcohol was not to be 
permitted in the district,189 but also created a cumbersome exception 
under which alcohol would be allowed within certain local-option-type 
enclaves.190 A license for liquor required the applicant to show:  
to the satisfaction of the court that a majority of the white male 
and female residents over the age of eighteen years other than 
Indians within two miles of the place where intoxicating liquor 
is to be manufactured, bartered, sold and exchanged . . . have, 
in good faith, consented to the manufacture, barter, sale and 
 
 183.  Carter Code § 142. 
 184.  See Brown, supra note 173, at 93, 96, 101–102. 
 185.  Rep. Moody commented: 
In other words, except in the sale of intoxicating liquors to Indians, 
there is established, absolutely, freedom in the sale of liquor in the 
Territory of Alaska . . . I do not believe that there is any place where 
intoxicating liquors are sold without the restriction of public legislation 
of any kind. If it may be found, it certainly can not be found in any one 
of the States of the union, or in any one of the Territories of the Union. 
32 CONG. REC. 383 (1899) (statement of Rep. Moody). 
 186.  32 CONG. REC. 586 (1899) (offered by Mr. Warner as an amendment to a 
pending amendment, ruled out of order); 32 CONG. REC. 587 (1899) (re-offered by 
Mr. Warner as a direct amendment to the bill). 
 187.  32 CONG. REC. 594 (1899). 
 188.  32 CONG. REC. 597 (1899); see Brown, supra note 173, at 93, 101. 
 189.  “That no person, corporation, or company shall sell, offer for sale, or 
keep for sale, traffic in, barter, or exchange for goods in said District of Alaska 
any intoxicating liquors, except as hereinafter provided.” Carter Code Criminal, 
ch. 429, § 462, 30 Stat. 1253–1343, 1337 (1899). 
 190.  See id. § 464 (limiting the distribution of liquor licenses to areas where 
the majority of whites over the age of eighteen within two miles of the 
distribution point have agreed to the manufacture, sale, exchange, etc. of liquor). 
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exchange . . . of the same.191  
Licensees were not allowed to provide liquor “to any minor, Indian, or 
intoxicated person, or to a habitual drunkard.”192  
One question to be addressed at this juncture is whether Carter 
Code § 142 was intended to supersede the extension of the general 
federal Indian liquor laws under the Seveloff fix.193 Certainly § 142, which 
explicitly repealed the liquor provisions of § 7 of the 1884 Act and 
repealed § 1955 of the Revised Statutes, did not contain any parallel 
repeal of the 1873 Seveloff Fix. But there is another point indicating that 
the Seveloff Fix and the Carter Code were intended to function in pari 
materia.  
As noted above, § 142, like most of the Carter Code, was derived 
from the Oregon Code of the time.194 Congress’s intent in 1899 was not 
just to copy the text of Oregon’s statutes, but also to incorporate pre-
1899 court rulings from Oregon interpreting those statutes.195 Alaska’s 
territorial court rulings recognized and adopted this incorporation of 
Oregon case law interpreting the parallel Oregon statutes,196 as did the 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. § 466. 
 193.  No court held or implied that the Carter Code provision repealed the 
Seveloff Fix, explicitly or implicitly. Years later, however, a 1937 opinion by 
Acting Solicitor Kirgis took the view that Carter Code § 142 (which by 1937 had 
become § 4963 of Compiled Laws of Alaska 1933) reflected an assumption that 
other FILL (specifically 25 U.S.C. § 241) were inapplicable in Alaska. The 
Protection of Indians and other Natives of Alaska from Liquor Traffic, 56 I.D. 
137 (1937). That Solicitor’s Opinion was later overturned (see Liquor Problems in 
‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 
26, 1967)), so may not be of any continuing consequence. See infra notes 235–241. 
 194.  See supra text accompanying notes 173–74. 
 195.  This came up at several points in the debate: 
Mr. Maddox: Do I understand the gentlemen to say that if we adopt this 
section of the bill we also adopt the construction given to it by the 
supreme court of that State? 
 
Mr. Warner: My understanding is that when you adopt a statute of a 
State which has been passed upon by the supreme court of that State, 
you thereby adopt such construction. 
32 CONG. REC. 422 (1899). “I will say to the gentleman from Arizona that this bill 
is in substance simply a codification of the laws of Oregon; and along with those 
laws will go the construction which the courts of Oregon have for many years 
applied to these statutes.” 32 CONG. REC. 388 (1899) (remarks of Rep. Gibson), 
quoted in Brown, supra note 173, at 95–96. See also id. at 100–01 (“Members of 
Congress knew whose law they chose for Alaska, and anticipated that older case 
law from the pre-adoption jurisdictions would follow the statutes to Alaska.”). 
 196.  See Bordenelli v. United States, 233 F.2d 120, 124 (9th Cir. 1956) (“A 
salient circumstance is the fact that the laws of the State of Oregon have been 
adopted as the pattern for the laws of Alaska since the organization of the 
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Alaska Supreme Court after statehood.197 
Thus, the question of whether Carter Code § 142 meant that the 
general federal Indian liquor laws no longer extended to Alaska is best 
assessed by examining whether § 142’s ancestral Oregon provision 
meant that the general FILL no longer extended to Oregon (recalling 
that the Tom ruling established that the 1850 Oregon Act had extended 
those liquor laws to Oregon). 
But the Oregon case law instead reflected the opposite view, that 
both the Oregon statute and the FILL were in effect. In 1855, Chief 
Justice Williams of the Oregon Territorial Supreme Court had decided 
that both the federal Indian liquor laws from 1834 and the Territorial 
Indian liquor law from 1854 were in effect in Oregon.198 Reciprocally, 
Oregon’s federal courts continued to hear prosecutions under the 
general federal Indian liquor laws after 1864 (when the Deady Code 
enacted the Oregon Territorial provision in § 654) and before 1899 (when 
Congress cloned Carter Code § 142 from Deady Code § 654); and still 
further, Federal District Court Judge Matthew Deady heard these 
cases.199 Deady had reason to know what was in the Oregon Territorial 
Code, not only from his tenure on the Oregon Territorial Supreme 
Court, but also because he had been largely responsible for the contents 
of the 1864 Oregon Code, for good reason called the “Deady Code.”200 
All these rulings indicate that the Oregon courts and federal courts 
regarded the general federal Indian liquor laws as applicable in Oregon 
notwithstanding the parallel application of Deady Code § 654 (and later 
Hill’s Annotated code § 1891).201 Congress’s intent that the Carter Code 
§142, derived from that provision, be interpreted consistently with 
 
territory. It seems plausible then that Congress, in providing for regulation of 
the liquor traffic and licensing in accordance with the tradition, envisaged a 
control system like that of Oregon”). 
 197.  See Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 207 (Alaska 1962) (“[A] statute 
adopted from another state, which has been construed by that state’s highest 
court, is presumed to be adopted with the construction thus placed upon it.”). 
 198.  Territory v. Coleman, 1 Or. 191, 192 (Or. 1855). 
 199.  United States v. Shaw-Mux, 27 F. Cas. 1049, 1049 (D. Or. 1873) (No. 
16,268); United States v. Winslow, 28 F. Cas. 737, 737 (D. Or. 1875) (No. 16,742). 
 200.  Harris, supra note 182, at 215 (“To Matthew P. Deady more than to any 
other single person is due the credit for the writing of all that body of laws 
which was enacted in 1862 and in 1864, and for nearly sixty years has served the 
people of the great commonwealth of Oregon.”); Beardsley, supra note 182, at 52 
(“In the preparation of the two Deady codes, Judge Deady was nominally 
assisted by others, but their efforts were addressed to the legislature, while he 
did the actual work of preparation, much of it without even the assistance of an 
amanuensis.”). 
 201.  See, e.g., Coleman, 1 Or. at 191; Shaw-Mux, 27 F. Cas. at 1049; Winslow, 28 
F. Cas. at 737. 
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Oregon case law would mean that § 142 did not reflect any assumption 
that the federal Indian liquor laws were inapplicable in Alaska. 
Although there were some differences between Carter Code § 142 
and the Seveloff fix legislation,202 Carter Code § 142 was essentially a 
“federal Indian liquor law” in its own right. It was a congressionally-
enacted statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to Natives and, although 
contained in a Code that consisted mainly of laws passed pursuant to 
Congressional authority over Territories under Article IV, § 3 of the 
Constitution,203 § 142 itself drew on congressional authority under the 
Indian Commerce Clause. In that sense, even if Carter Code § 142 had 
completely supplanted the Seveloff fix, it still would have maintained 
Alaska’s status as Indian country solely for purposes of prohibiting 
liquor transactions with Indians. 
In 1909, Congress amended Carter Code § 142 to increase the 
possible sentence to two years, limit its scope to liquor by removing 
firearms, and define “Indian” to exclude citizens of the United States.204 
(“Indian” now included “the aboriginal races inhabiting Alaska when 
annexed to the United States, and their descendants of the whole or half 
blood, who have not become citizens of the United States.”205) These 
changes brought the Carter Code into closer alignment with the other 
federal Indian liquor laws. 
Thus, as of the first decade of the twentieth century, the Seveloff Fix 
was still unrepealed, and sale of alcohol to Natives in Alaska was still 
illegal. Shortly afterwards, an Alaska Territorial Legislature was 
congressionally authorized and, although its authority over alcohol was 
quite limited, it began to play a role in the changing alcohol landscape.  
 
 202.  RS 2139 (one of the successor provisions to sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 
Trade and Intercourse Act), applicable to Alaska through the Seveloff fix, had a 
longer incarceration period (up to two years) and smaller fine (up to $300) than 
those in § 142 of the Carter Code (incarceration of up to six months, fine of up to 
$500). Carter Code Criminal, ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274 (1899). Also, 
Carter Code § 142 encompassed firearms, which the Seveloff Fix did not, and the 
Seveloff Fix called on individual Indians to seize and destroy liquor, which the 
Carter Code § 142 did not. 
 203.  U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3 (“The congress shall have power to dispose of 
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property of the United States.”). 
 204.  Act of Feb. 6, 1909, ch. 80, § 9, 35 Stat. 603. 
 205.  Id.; see In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905) (legalizing the sale of liquor to 
an Indian who had attained United States citizenship through receiving a patent 
to an Indian allotment). Although the United States Supreme Court in 1915 
overruled Heff and held that granting citizenship did not abrogate tribal 
relations and did not take Indians out of the working of the general federal 
Indian liquor laws, United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1915), Congress in 
1924 mooted any remaining distinctions between citizens and non-citizens by 
conferring citizenship on all Indians. Snyder Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253. 
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J. 1912: From District to Territory 
In the 1912 Alaska Territorial Organic Act Congress granted Alaska 
its own legislature, with somewhat circumscribed authority, to meet in 
sixty-day sessions every two years.206 Congress limited the newly 
created legislature’s authority, excluding alcohol from the scope of that 
authority: “nor shall spirituous or intoxicating liquors be manufactured 
or sold, except under such regulations and restrictions as Congress shall 
provide.”207 
Notwithstanding Congress’s reservation of that power to itself, 
Alaska’s Second Territorial Legislature in 1915 enacted an amendment 
to what had been §142 of the Carter Code, and was at that point found 
in § 2022 of the 1913 Complied Laws of Alaska (1913 CLA).  
The Territorial Legislature sought to overrule a 1913 Ninth Circuit 
decision. Lott v. United States208 raised the question of whether an Indian 
attempting to purchase alcohol should be subject to indictment and 
punishable as an accomplice for soliciting, inciting, or abetting the seller 
to violate Carter Code § 142.209 The prosecution argued for this result, 
relying on the fact that Congress in 1909 had effectively changed a 
violation of Carter Code § 142 from a misdemeanor to a felony210 and, 
coupling that with the 1899 enactment adopting the common law of 
England for Alaska,211 invoked the common-law rule that abettors of 
felonies could be prosecuted.212 But the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument, analogizing § 142 to other federal Indian liquor laws and 
citing the “universal ruling of the courts that under laws prohibiting the 
sale of intoxicating liquors the purchaser committed no offense,” and 
holding that Congress would have had to express this intent explicitly to 
achieve that result.213 
In response to Lott, the Territorial Legislature’s 1915 enactment 
amended § 2022 by adding a provision criminalizing an Indian for 
“wrongfully and willfully solicit[ing], incit[ing] or induc[ing] any person 
to furnish him or her with [alcohol],” punishable by the same 
sanctions.214 Simultaneously, the legislation removed the reference to 
 
 206.  Territorial Organic Act, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512 (1912). 
 207.  Id. § 9. 
 208.  205 F. 28 (9th Cir. 1913). 
 209.  Id. at 31. 
 210.  See supra text accompanying note 204. 
 211.  Carter Code Criminal, ch. 429, § 218, 30 Stat. 1253, 1285 (1899). See supra 
text accompanying note 189; see also Brown, supra note 173, at 97–99. 
 212.  Lott, 205 F. at 31. 
 213.  Id. 31–32. 
 214. 1915 Alaska Sessions Laws ch. 51 
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“half-blood,”215 removed the definition of “Indian,”216 and downgraded 
the crime back from a felony to a misdemeanor.217  
However, these amendments, as laws regarding how spirituous 
liquors were to be sold, likely exceeded the scope of authority Congress 
had delegated to the Territorial Legislature.218  
Thus, after 1915, the status of § 2022 of the 1913 CLA, formerly 
Carter Code § 142, may have been questionable. It is unclear whether 
prosecutions should have been brought under § 2022 as last amended by 
Congress in 1909, or under the new § 2022 as amended by the Territorial 
Legislature in 1915. Most defendants presumably preferred the latter, as 
the penalties after the 1915 legislation were less severe; but Alaska 
Natives who might be prosecuted for attempting to buy alcohol 
presumably preferred the former, under which their actions did not 
constitute a crime.  
These issues were left unresolved, as Alaska led the rest of the 
country into prohibition, and new laws joined the overlapping layers of 
alcohol regulation in Alaska. 
K. 1917: The “Bone Dry” Law and Alaska’s Second Prohibition 
After losing the battle over the Carter Code in 1899, the temperance 
forces regrouped. The 1915 Alaska Territorial legislature put a 
referendum before the voters on whether Alaska should ask Congress to 
make it a dry territory.219 A large margin approved this measure.220 In 
response, Congress in 1917 enacted “An Act to prohibit the manufacture 
or sale of alcoholic liquors in the Territory of Alaska.”221 
Later in 1917, Congress voted to put the Eighteenth Amendment 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. This definition had excluded citizens, so the intent was to encompass 
citizen and non-citizen Indians. 
 217. Id. A first offense was punishable by a fine of between $120 and $500, or 
incarceration for 60 to 250 days. Subsequent offenses incurred fines of between 
$240 to $1000, and incarceration for four months to one year. (Prior to the 
amendment, the fine was $100 to $500, and the incarceration term up to two 
years.). 
 218.  See supra text accompanying note 207. 
 219.  1915 Alaska Sessions Laws, ch. 7. 
 220.  Alaska Natives were not yet citizens, but at least some apparently voted 
in this election. See EVANGELINE ATWOOD, FRONTIER POLITICS: ALASKA’S JAMES 
WICKERSHAM 310 (1979). Also voting were Alaska’s women residents and, 
although they only made up about 20% of the vote, their concerted campaigning 
on the issue helped pass the initiative with a majority of 62%. See M. Ehrlander, 
The Paradox of Alaska’s 1916 Alcohol Referendum: A Dry Vote within a Frontier 
Alcohol Culture, 102 PAC. NW. Q. 29, 39 (2011). 
 221.  Act of Feb. 14, 1917, ch. 53, 39 Stat. 903. 
ARTICLE 2 - HARRINGTON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015 2:03 PM 
74 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 32:1 
before the States for ratification (following Alaska’s lead by placing the 
amendment before each state’s voters, rather than each state’s 
legislature). After ratification in December 1918, the United States 
followed Alaska into legally enforced temperance as Congress passed 
the National Prohibition Act (the “Volstead Act”). 
Alaska thus faced an “implied repeal” question in some respects 
parallel to those considered above for the Seveloff fix. Alaskans now had 
two separate statutes criminalizing their possession of alcohol: Alaska’s 
1917 Bone Dry law and the 1919 national Volstead Act.222 As the 
Volstead Act had lesser penalties, criminal defendants charged under 
the harsher Bone Dry law argued that it had been repealed by the 
Volstead Act. 
L. 1921: In Pari Materia Versus Repeal by Implication, Round Three 
The 1921 Abbate v. United States223 case reached the issue of whether 
the Volstead Act repealed the Bone Dry law. The Volstead Act actually 
had an explicit repealer clause,224 to the extent of inconsistencies with 
prior laws. The Ninth Circuit rejected that repealer argument, holding 
that both statutes were in effect in Alaska.225  
Further, the opinion indicated that the Bone Dry Law was in 
accordance with the congressional history of treating Alaska as Indian 
country for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws: 
Congress enacted the Bone Dry Law for Alaska, and 20 months 
later it enacted the National Prohibition Act. In enacting the 
latter Congress was adopting legislation for the whole United 
States to carry out the provisions of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. In enacting the Bone Dry Law, on the other hand, 
Congress was pursuing its policy of prohibition in Indian 
country. That policy as to Alaska was first manifested by 
legislation enacted on July 27, 1868, for the prevention of the 
importation and sale of intoxicating liquors in Alaska, the 
 
 222.  Additionally, two statutes criminalized the conveyance of liquor to 
Alaska Natives: § 2022 of the 1913 CLA, and R.S. 2139 as extended to Alaska in 
1873. JOINT COMM. ON TERRITORIES OF THE SENATE & HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF ALASKA, S. DOC. NO. 62-1093, at 677–78 
(1913). 
 223.  270 F. 735 (9th Cir. 1921). 
 224.  “All provisions of law that are inconsistent with this act are repealed 
only to the extent of such inconsistency and the regulations herein provided for 
the manufacture or traffic in intoxicating liquor shall be construed as an addition 
to existing laws.” National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, § 35, 41 Stat. 317, 
quoted in Abbate, 270 F. at 735. 
 225.  Abbate, 270 F. at 737. 
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population of which was largely composed of Indians, and it 
was continued without interruption until the enactment of the 
Bone Dry Law of February 14, 1917. That act contains 
provisions peculiarly applicable to Alaska, and which are more 
drastic and far-reaching, and involve severer penalties for the 
same offense, than do the provisions of the National 
Prohibition Act.226 
Abbate thus established the paramountcy of reading overlapping 
liquor laws in pari materia with each other rather than determining 
which provisions had impliedly repealed which earlier provisions. 
Abbate did not mention the 1873 Seveloff fix, but it is impossible to read 
Abbate and conclude that the District Organic Act, the Carter Code, the 
Bone Dry Law, or the Volstead Act would have repealed the Seveloff fix. 
The Abbate opinion remained the controlling authority on the 
simultaneous enforceability question in Alaska.227 However, the 
references to “Indian country” in the opinion prompted concerns 
echoing the Waters v. Campbell debate over whether Alaska was full-
fledged Indian country. Territorial District Court Judge Ritchie in a 1923 
case rejected this interpretation: 
It was suggested in the argument by counsel for the defendant 
in this case that the statement just quoted [“In enacting the 
Bone Dry Law. . . Congress was pursuing its policy of 
prohibition in Indian country”] amounted to a dictum that all 
Alaska is Indian country. I do not think Judge Gilbert intended 
to say that, nor is his statement susceptible of that construction 
when the entire paragraph is read.228 
 
 226.  Id. at 736. 
 227.  Subsequent decisions made it clear that defendants might be prosecuted 
under one statute or the other, but the same incident could not be prosecuted 
under both. United States v. Ashworth, 7 Alaska 64, 70 (D. Alaska 1923). Also, 
the Volstead Act’s heightened protections for issuance of warrants to search 
private dwellings prevailed over the more general warrant standards of the 
Alaska Bone Dry law. United States v. Berkeness, 16 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1926). 
 228.  United States v. Olsen, 6 Alaska 571, 573 (D. Alaska 1923). The opinion 
impliedly recognizes that Indian country for liquor law purposes is not the same 
as Indian country for general purposes; Judge Ritchie explained that the Abbate 
court had correctly noted that the population of Alaska was largely Indian, and 
that Congress had been pursuing its policy of prohibition in Indian country, but 
this did not equate to a holding that Alaska generally was Indian country. Id. at 
573. (But simultaneously he recognized that there were areas of full Indian 
country within Alaska. “The territory is not Indian country, aside from Indian 
reservations and lands owned by Indians, because they actually live upon 
them.” Id. at 573–74.). 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently refused to overrule Abbate, when invited to 
do so on the basis that Abbate had wrongly concluded that Congress had been 
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The relevant conclusions from this Bone Dry era are: (1) neither the 
advent of prohibition nor its end repealed the Seveloff Fix; and (2) 
overlapping liquor laws should be read as coexisting, with no implied 
repeal judicially pronounced unless the two laws were impossible to 
reconcile. 
Alaska’s “second prohibition” ended in 1934.229 In 1933, Congress 
passed the Blaine Act to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment and voided 
the Volstead Act. In 1934, Congress repealed the Alaska Bone Dry 
Law.230  
M. 1934-1941: Post-Prohibition 
What had been § 142 of the Carter Code, and later § 2022 of the 
1913 Compiled Laws of Alaska, had now become § 4963 of the 1933 
Compiled Laws of Alaska. Its text remained the same as it had been 
following the 1915 Territorial Legislature’s amendment. It was a 
misdemeanor for any person, without the authority of the United States, 
to convey to any Indian any alcohol, and it was a misdemeanor for any 
Indian to “wrongfully and willfully solicit, incite or induce any person 
to furnish him or her with” the same.231 
Beyond the narrow context of the federal Indian liquor laws, the 
federal government was clarifying its policies as to Alaska Natives, 
bringing their legal status closer to that of American Indians. After 1931, 
the Alaskan responsibilities of the Office of Education were transferred 
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.232 The Interior Department issued an 
opinion in 1932 concluding that “no distinction has been or can be made 
between the Indians and other Natives of Alaska so far as the laws and 
relations of the United States are concerned.”233 The 1936 Alaska Indian 
Reorganization Act was passed to give Alaska Native Communities 
those opportunities that tribes in the lower 48 states had been afforded 
 
pursuing its policy of prohibition in Indian country. “This may or may not have 
been the purpose and reason for the enactment, but the law was at least enacted 
to supply some local need, real or apparent, and the result is the same.” 
Stanworth v. United States, 45 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1930). 
 229.  Act of Apr. 13, 1934, ch. 119, 48 Stat. 583. 
 230.  In repealing the Alaska Bone Dry Act, Congress extended the authority 
of the Alaska Territorial Legislature under the 1912 Territorial Act to encompass 
alcohol. Pub. L. No. 73-158, § 2, 48 Stat. 583 (1934). It explicitly ratified a 1933 
Territorial enactment (Territorial Enactment from 1933, SLA 1933, ch. 109) 
creating a board of liquor control. Id. § 3. It repealed sections 462 to 478 of the 
1899 Carter Code, id. § 4, which had contained the “high license” provisions. But 
this did not mean that the Territory’s authority over liquor issues was unlimited. 
 231.  Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 4963 (1933). 
 232.  Sec’y of the Interior’s Order No. 494, Mar. 14, 1931. 
 233.  Status of Alaska Natives, 53 L.D. 593, 605 (1932). 
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under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.234  
This was also the period during which Acting Solicitor Kirgis 
opined that § 4963 of the 1933 CLA235 reflected an assumption that 25 
U.S.C. 241236 was not applicable in Alaska. This opinion was eventually 
overruled,237 and as noted above, Kirgis’s analysis failed to take into 
account the interpretation of the Oregon predecessors to § 4963.238 But 
there was yet another flaw in Kirgis’s analysis, in that the opinion stated, 
“No reported decision has been found dealing with the application of 
Section 241, Title 25, United States Code, to the Territory of Alaska.”239 
However, there was reported case authority on that question: the Seveloff 
case itself, and the subsequent United States v. Carr and Waters v. 
Campbell decisions, though one would have to know that what was 
housed in 25 U.S.C. § 241 as of 1937 had previously been section 20 of 
the 1834 Act.240 The reasons Interior decided eventually to abandon 
Kirgis’s opinion were based on other factors,241 but abandonment was 
the proper course.  
N. 1948: The New Indian Country Definitions 
The new 1948 definition of “Indian Country” in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
 
 234.  DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN 
LAWS, 384–87 (3d ed. 2012). 
 235.  Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 4963 (1933). Section 4963 was the successor 
to Carter Code § 142. 
 236.  Part of the federal Indian liquor laws, a successor provision to section 20 
of the 1834 Act. 
 237.  See The Protection of Indians and other Natives of Alaska from Liquor 
Traffic, supra note 193. 
 238.  See supra text accompanying notes 193–99. 
 239.  The Protection of Indians and other Natives of Alaska from Liquor 
Traffic, supra note 193. 
 240.  In fairness to Acting Solicitor Kirgis, legal research on Indian law issues 
was quite difficult in 1937. “By the 1930s there was thus a fully developed 
federal Indian law, including treaties, statutes, cases, and administrative 
decisions. Yet, given the multiplicity of sources and their complexity, it was not 
easily accessible . . . .” DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX M. 
COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 166 (2007). Felix 
Cohen himself, writing in 1941 before the Kirgis opinion had been overruled, 
treated Kirgis’s opinion as setting out Interior’s view, but did not regard that 
view as limiting the potential for Alaska Tribes to enact their own liquor control 
ordinances. He suggested that, rather than relying on federal enforcement, tribes 
consider controlling the liquor traffic in organized Indian communities by 
adopting measures for liquor control independent of the Territorial law. See Re 
the Intoxicating Liquor Traffic Among Natives in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t 
of the Interior, M-31324 (Aug. 14, 1941), available at http://thorpe. 
ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1051-1075.html. 
 241.  See Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of 
Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967). 
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became the cornerstone to determining whether and where “full-
fledged” Indian country existed in Alaska and throughout the United 
States. Of the three types of “Indian country” included in the definition, 
reservations and allotments clearly were present in Alaska as of 1948.242 
The first consideration of the implications of the new statutory 
definition for Alaska arose in the alcohol context. In December 1948, 
Solicitor Mastin G. White, while not explicitly overruling the Kirgis 
opinion, noted that it had predated the 1948 statute defining Indian 
country, and opined that the federal Indian liquor laws were applicable 
to any federal reservations, including those in Alaska, and to non-
reservation dependent Indian communities in Alaska as well.243 At the 
time when Solicitor White was writing, Congress had not explicated in 
the new code that “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian 
liquor laws might have a different scope than the general definition (as 
above, this occurred in 1949),244 so Solicitor White had no occasion to 
consider that possibility. Still, the opinion is significant because it 
recognized that there was no actual legal barrier to application of the 
federal Indian liquor laws in Alaska, and implicitly acknowledged that 
alcohol control issues in Alaska’s Native communities were as crucial as 
for lower 48 tribes. 
A later Solicitor’s opinion notes that, following Solicitor White’s 
letter, consideration was given by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
enforcement of the federal Indian liquor laws in Alaska, but the BIA 
lacked sufficient personnel to do so.245  
O. 1953: A Questionable End for Carter Code § 142  
In 1953, the same year that Congress changed the federal Indian 
liquor laws into a delegation of authority to states and tribes,246 Alaska’s 
Territorial Legislature revamped its liquor laws, in several respects. 
Most significantly, it repealed ACLA 1949 sec. 65-3-7, which had been 
the successor to § 142 of the 1899 Carter Code.247 To the extent that the 
 
 242. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 234, at 81–112 (reservations), 113-164 
(allotments). 
 243.  See Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of 
Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967), at 3 (quoting BIA Files 50082-1945-
126). 
 244.  Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 28, 63 Stat. 94 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1156 (2012)). See supra text accompanying notes 11–12. 
 245.  See Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of 
Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967), at 3 (quoting BIA Files 50082-1945-
126). 
 246.  See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
 247.  1953 Alaska Session Laws ch. 42. ACLA 1949 sec. 65-3-7 had been the 
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the Seveloff fix was eclipsed by the first prohibition, by the Carter Code, 
or by the second prohibition, all those enactments had now been 
explicitly repealed. 
The bill to effect that repeal (House Bill 102) was one of a quartet of 
bills introduced to make significant changes to Alaska’s liquor laws. 
The closely related House Bill 101, “An Act prescribing criminal 
penalties for drunkenness and for selling or giving intoxicating liquor to 
common drunkards,” indicates that its purpose was to replace the to-be-
repealed Indian-specific provision of ACLA § 65-13-7 with a race-neutral 
prohibition on providing liquor to “common drunkards” of any 
extraction. By contrast with House Bill 102, which passed with virtually 
no debate,248 House Bill 101 was debated on the House Floor, where the 
term “common drunkard” was replaced by “habitual drunkard,” then 
an amendment was offered to replace that with “alcoholic,” then an 
amendment to the amendment suggesting “chronic alcoholic,” 
whereupon the bill was re-referred back to a committee for further 
consideration, ultimately not getting a House Floor vote.249  
House Bills 100 and 103, both of which did pass, were broader, 
eliminating Alaska’s Territorial Liquor Control Board and delegating 
much of its prior authority to the Territory’s municipalities, and many of 
its prior duties to the District Courts.250 Later cases found this to fall 
outside the Territorial Legislature’s congressionally-delegated 
authority.251 The legislature in 1957 re-established the Territorial Liquor 
Control Board and re-enacted most of those repealed laws, with some 
amendments.252  
Although repeal of § 65-3-7 also might have exceeded the 
Territorial Legislature’s authority based on that same reasoning, there 
was no challenge to that repeal, or attempts to re-enact that statute. 
Assuming the validity of that repeal, the Seveloff Fix had effectively 
outlasted the Carter Code.  
 
successor to Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 4963 (1933) of the 1933 Compiled Laws 
of Alaska, in turn the successor to section 2022 of the 1913 Compiled Laws of 
Alaska, in turn the successor to section 142 of the 1899 Carter Code. 
 248.  Alaska Territorial Leg., H. Journal, at 348, 405–06, 412–13, 743, 757, 763, 
867 (Alaska 1953) (hereafter 1953 Alaska House Journal). 
 249. 1953 Alaska House Journal at 348, 377, 605–06, 638. 
 250.  1953 Alaska Session Laws chapters 43 (H.B. 103), 131 (H.B. 100). 
 251.  See Bordenelli v. United States, 233 F.2d 120, 124 (9th Cir. 1956); Woo v. 
City of Anchorage, 154 F. Supp. 944, 947 (D. Alaska 1957). 
 252.  1957 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 131. 
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P. 1957-1960: Full Indian Country and Full Statehood 
The 1948 statutory definition of “Indian country” had ramifications 
for Alaska beyond the federal Indian liquor laws, and developments in 
the late 1950s took the discussion in that direction. The debates over the 
next several decades focused on the existence vel non of “full” Indian 
country in Alaska, rather than FILL Indian country. A 1957 case held 
that the Tyonek reservation was “Indian country” within the meaning of 
the 1948 definition, and the Territory could not prosecute a criminal case 
for statutory rape within the reservation, because Congress had not 
conferred authority upon the Territory to do so within “Indian 
country.”253 Congress responded by extending P.L. 280254 to Alaska in 
1958,255 adding the Territory of Alaska as a sixth mandatory P.L. 280 
jurisdiction, in accord with the generally assimilationist polices of that 
era. This ensured that the Territory had complete criminal and civil 
jurisdiction within whatever areas of full “Indian country” might 
eventually be found to exist within the Territory. For our purposes the 
relevant point is that the extension of P.L. 280 to Alaska did not purport 
to repeal the Seveloff fix. 
Alaska’s Statehood Act was signed into law July 7, 1958256 and, 
following approval by Alaska’s voters on August 26, 1958, President 
Eisenhower signed the official declaration on January 3, 1959. Whatever 
limits Congress had formerly imposed on the Territorial Legislature’s 
authority over alcohol were left behind. But the Statehood Act did not 
repeal the Seveloff fix, and Statehood in and of itself did not affect the 
application of the federal Indian liquor laws. Any full-fledged “Indian 
country” then in Alaska was subject to the provisos in the Alaska 
Statehood Act § 4,257 and arguably the same was true of any “liquor law 
 
 253.  In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Alaska 1957). 
 254.  Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). This “PL 280” authority was 
mandatory in five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin) and optional for other states. The optional provision was made 
contingent on tribal consent in 1968. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 
Stat. 7 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012)). 
 255.  Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984)) (adding the Territory of Alaska to the five “mandatory” 
PL 280 states). 
 256.  Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified at 
48 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)). 
 257.  Id. § 4. (“[S]aid State and its people do agree and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to any lands or other property, (including 
fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, 
or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is held by the United States in trust for 
said natives . . . .”). 
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only” Indian country. Alaska’s attainment of statehood did not 
terminate congressional authority to declare (in the past or in the future) 
parcels of land as “Indian country” within the new State.258 Statehood 
neither enlarged nor diminished any Indian country, either “full-
fledged” or “liquor only.” 
Q. 1967-1968: the Federal Indian Liquor Laws Re-Recognized in 
Alaska 
In 1967, the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs issued an opinion 
reconsidering the 1937 Kirgis opinion noted above, and definitively 
concluded that “the Indian liquor laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154 et seq., are 
applicable to ‘Indian country’ in Alaska.”259 The new opinion listed 
several reasons for rejecting the former Acting Solicitor’s opinion.260 
Just as importantly, the opinion also noted that the 1953 
restructuring of the federal liquor laws to delegate authority to tribes 
would apply in Alaska:  
Thus, if an organized native group does not elect to permit 
liquor on its reserve or in its community, the Federal Indian 
liquor laws still apply. If it votes for the conditional suspension 
of such federal laws, acts in violation of either state or tribal 
law are likewise in violation of Federal law.261 
A follow-up memorandum in early 1968 addressed questions about 
whether formation of an Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) Council 
should be regarded as either necessary or sufficient to constitute a 
dependent Indian community. There were Alaska Native communities 
 
 258.  “The fact that the ceded territory is within the limits of Minnesota is a 
mere incident; for the act of Congress imported into the treaty applies alike to all 
Indian tribes occupying a particular country, whether within or without State 
lines.” United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876). 
 259. Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of 
the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967). 
 260.  Id. These included: (1) the 1899 “Carter Code” provision applied only to 
non-citizen Indian purchases, whereas all Alaska Natives became citizens in 
1924; (2) the territorial law into which the “Carter Code” provision had evolved 
had been repealed; (3) the new “Indian country” definition had been enacted, 
and Solicitor White had concluded in 1948 that this new definition encompassed 
Gambell and Savoonga; and (4) the 1958 extension of P.L. 280 to Alaska 
recognized the existence of “Indian country” in Alaska. 
 261.  Id. The opinion notes that the natives were “desirous of having the 
Federal exclusionary statutes enforced,” observes that the Law and Order 
branch of the BIA had informally indicated its concurrence with the application 
of the federal Indian liquor laws, and urges the Regional Solicitor to confer with 
the local United States Attorney’s office, observing that that lack of BIA 
enforcement personnel had been noted as a problem in 1948. 
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which wanted liquor banned but had not formed an IRA Council; and 
there were IRA organizations that had been formed in “mixed” 
communities. The supplemental opinion posited that Alaska Native 
communities should be able to exercise their alcohol authority without 
having to form IRA Councils. As to the mixed communities question, 
the opinion noted that at that point there were no IRA Councils seeking 
to exercise alcohol authority in mixed communities, and suggested that 
when such issues arose, they should be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis based on pragmatic considerations, and local need should 
determine enforcement policy.262  
The supplemental opinion also noted that the Arctic Slope Native 
Association had passed a resolution purporting to exercise some 
measure of alcohol jurisdiction. The opinion rejected the premise that 
ASNA could be a Native community for liquor law purposes; it was up 
to individual Native communities to determine their own course.263  
These 1967 and 1968 opinions, although arising in the area of 
federal Indian liquor law enforcement, looked primarily to the 1948 
statutory definition of “full-fledged” Indian country. Their authors 
would not have seen any need to discuss the possibility that Indian 
country for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws might be any 
different than Indian country for general purposes, and they did not 
discuss it. No necessity of tying their conclusions to a “FILL” rather than 
full Indian country framework would arise for another thirty years. 
Nevertheless, the Seveloff Fix had now survived the Kirgis opinion.  
R. 1971-1986: ANCSA and Post-ANCSA Tribal Liquor Ordinances 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) did not 
purport to repeal the Seveloff fix. 
ANCSA did revoke all existing reservations in Alaska except for 
Metlakatla. Still, discussions of the application of the federal Indian 
liquor laws in Alaska remained focused on “full” Indian country, 
although it shifted away from the now-terminated reservations and 
towards whether Native lands in Alaska constituted Indian country 
under the “allotment” or “dependent Indian community” legs of the 
general Indian country definition.  
The Solicitor’s office considered post-ANCSA village alcohol 
control authority in an October 1980 memorandum concerning a 
 
 262.  Liquor Control, Indian communities, Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of 
the Interior, M-36712 Supp. (Jan. 15, 1968). 
 263.  Id. 
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proposed liquor ordinance from the Village of Allakaket.264 Much of the 
opinion concerns the view that, notwithstanding ANCSA’s revocation of 
Alaska reservations outside Metlakatla, the phrase “dependent Indian 
communities” in the 18 U.S.C. § 1151 definition might still fit Alaska 
Native communities (a view which, under the interpretation of that 
phrase adopted in the subsequent Venetie opinion, we now know will 
not encompass ANCSA lands). The opinion additionally notes that 
allotments also fall within the general statutory definition of “Indian 
country,” a view that has survived the Venetie decision, which itself 
noted that possibility.265 As to both allotments and dependent Indian 
communities, the opinion considers the question of whether an Alaska 
Native Village could have jurisdiction over alcohol outside a 
“reservation,” as tribal authority over non-reservation lands is an 
“unresolved issue,” but concludes that tribes can exercise delegated 
federal authority under 25 U.S.C. § 1161 as to non-reservation lands, for 
which the federal authority exists even though the authority of the tribe 
itself might be questionable absent federal delegation. 
The opinion notes several problems with the particular Allakaket 
ordinance that had been submitted for Interior review. The ordinance 
purported to apply a criminal penalty to all persons violating it; the 
opinion notes the village would have to either limit the criminal 
penalties to Indians and Alaska Natives (over whom the tribe could 
exercise criminal jurisdiction) or change its enforcement to civil 
mechanisms. The ordinance conveyed the impression that the tribe itself 
would be enforcing the criminal penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1154(a), which 
would need to be changed as only federal authorities could enforce that 
statute (noting that those federal authorities could of course prosecute 
non-Natives as well as Natives). Adequate due process safeguards 
should be set out in the ordinance itself because they would be required 
by the Indian Civil Rights Act, and because the alternative of having 
these rights set out in the tribal constitution was inapplicable to 
Allakaket which lacked a written constitution. The opinion ended by 
noting that resources to effect federal enforcement of the federal Indian 
liquor laws, having been a problem in the 1940s and 1960s, would 
presumably still be a problem in the 1980s, and should be discussed 
with the local U.S. Attorney’s office. 
There is no record that a revised ordinance for Allakaket was 
 
 264.  Memorandum from Comm’r of Indian Affairs, Liquor Ordinance, 
Village of Allakaket, Alaska, to Associate Solicitor for the Division of Indian 
Affairs (Oct. 1, 1980). 
 265.  Venetie Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.2. 
(1998). 
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certified and published by the Department of the Interior. Subsequently, 
however, between 1983 and 1986, three Native villages (Chalkyitsik, 
Minto, and Northway) had their alcohol ordinances certified and 
published in the Federal Register by the Secretary of the Interior.266 
Notably, the State of Alaska did not sue to challenge the ability of 
these tribes to have their Indian country recognized for purposes of their 
alcohol ordinances. 
S. 1987-1998: Venetie, a Taxing Case 
However, a tribe asking to have Indian country recognized for 
purposes of tribal taxation was a different matter. In 1987, the State of 
Alaska challenged tribes’ ability to have their “full” Indian country 
status recognized for the purpose of imposing business taxes in Alaska v. 
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,267 in which the State 
eventually prevailed in 1998 before the United States Supreme Court.  
This requires an assessment of whether the ruling and reasoning in 
Venetie are harmonizable with the premise that Congress could, and did, 
extend the federal Indian liquor laws to Alaska. For several reasons, the 
answer is yes.  
In Venetie, the Court only interpreted the tripartite definition of 
full-fledged Indian country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, not the alternate 
provision for liquor-law-only Indian country found in Title 18. There 
were no alcohol control issues before the Court in Venetie; the twelve-
word introduction to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 referencing the differing definition 
of Indian country for liquor law purposes was so irrelevant to the 
Court’s analysis that it was omitted from its quotation of that statute.268 
Furthermore, the Court’s observation that “primary jurisdiction 
over land that is Indian country rests with the Federal Government and 
the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States”269 is true enough 
of full Indian country, but not of FILL Indian country, in which the 
States and Indian tribes both have authority to impose their own limits 
on alcohol possession and transactions. The Court simply was not 
contemplating the question of whether Alaska might contain Indian 
 
 266.  See Village of Chalkyitsik, Alaska; Ordinance Prohibiting the 
Introduction, Possession, and Sale of Intoxicating Beverages, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,378, 
21,378 (May 12, 1983); Native Village of Northway; Ordinance Providing for the 
Introduction, Possession and Sale of Intoxicating Beverages, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,195, 
30,195 (June 30, 1983); Village of Minto Liquor Ordinance, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,779, 
28,779 (Aug. 11, 1986). 
 267.  522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 268.  Id. at 526–27. 
 269.  Id. at 527 n.1. 
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country for the limited purpose of the federal Indian liquor laws. 
Interpreting the “dependent Indian communities” term in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151 as a matter of first impression, the Court held that it referred to a 
“limited category” of Indian lands satisfying a “set-aside” requirement 
and a “superintendence” requirement.270 Venetie’s ANCSA lands did not 
meet the “set-aside” requirement because ANCSA lands might 
eventually be owned by non-Natives and could currently be used for 
non-Indian purposes.271 They did not meet the “superintendence” 
requirement because Venetie had received title to the transferred land in 
fee simple.”272 In effect, the Venetie lands were not § 1151 Indian country 
because they were fee-patented lands in what might eventually be a 
non-Indian community. But “fee patented land in a non-Indian 
community” is exactly that category of land which, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1154 and 1156, is federal Indian liquor law Indian country, if and only if 
there is a treaty or statute extending the liquor laws thereto. So it is 
entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s characterization of ANCSA 
lands in Venetie to recognize that a statute extending the Indian liquor 
laws to any particular parcel of land needs to be given that effect, even if 
that land is fee-patented land in a non-Indian community, or fee-
patented land in what may eventually become a non-Indian community. 
Another passage in Venetie demonstrates the congruence of this 
article’s thesis with that holding. The Court explained that “The federal 
set-aside requirement also reflects the fact that because Congress has 
plenary power over Indian affairs . . . some explicit action by 
Congress . . . must be taken to create or to recognize Indian country.”273 
The Seveloff fix, in creating FILL Indian country in Alaska, certainly 
demonstrated explicit action by Congress, and Congress’s plenary 
power over Indian affairs means that courts have to respect what 
Congress has legislated and has not repealed.  
The concluding passage in Venetie emphasized that the 
“superintendence” which the Court would need to find in a “dependent 
Indian community” conflicted with a statute like ANCSA that was 
intended to promote self-determination and end paternalism.274 But, to 
 
 270.  Id. at 527. 
 271.  “Because Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the 
former Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian 
purposes, we must conclude that the federal set-aside requirement is not met.” 
Id. at 533. 
 272.  Id. at 524. The Court, while acknowledging that the Pueblos of New 
Mexico were owned by those tribes in fee simple, characterized that title as “not 
fee simple title in the commonly understood sense of the term.” Id. at 528. 
 273. Id. at 531 n.6. 
 274.  Id. at 534. 
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find FILL Indian country, the courts need not look for dependence or 
paternalism; they need only look for an explicit congressional 
enactment. The federal Indian liquor laws over sixty years ago left 
behind the dependence and paternalism that accompanied the original 
enactment of the federal Indian liquor laws, and converted them into a 
vehicle for promotion of tribal autonomy, by delegating authority to the 
tribes to craft their own alcohol laws: “[I]n enacting [18 U.S.C.] § 1161, 
Congress intended to recognize that Native Americans are not ‘weak 
and defenseless,’ and are capable of making personal decisions about 
alcohol consumption without special assistance from the Federal 
Government.”275 Thus, eighteen years before ANCSA’s passage in 1971, 
the federal Indian liquor laws had already discarded their prior 
“wardship” and “paternalism” aspects that the Venetie opinion found 
antithetical to ANCSA’s philosophy,276 and, by bestowing on tribes a 
federally-delegated authority to regulate liquor within their 
communities, promoted the very “self-determination” which was later 
to become ANCSA’s touchstone. There is thus no conflict between the 
policies the Venetie court found to be the underpinnings of ANCSA, and 
the conclusion that Alaska Native Villages should be entitled to exercise 
their federally-delegated authority over alcohol within their 
communities.  
Finally, Justice Thomas’s observation that “[w]hether the concept of 
Indian country should be modified is a question entirely for 
Congress”277 underscores the fact that, if Congress has modified the 
concept of “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian liquor 
laws by extending those laws to any particular parcel of “fee patented 
land in a non-Indian community” through a statute so specifying, then 
finding that fee-patented land to be Indian country for that limited 
purpose would not only be compatible with the Venetie opinion, but in 
fact binding on the United States Supreme Court as well as the lower 
courts.  
Nothing in the ruling or reasoning of the Court in Venetie should be 
read to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that Alaska Native Villages 
have a valid claim to occupy liquor-law-only FILL Indian country. 
Before turning to the last section, it may be helpful to review. 
“Indian country,” which the federal Indian liquor law statutes require 
for tribes to exercise delegated federal authority to enact their own tribal 
alcohol ordinances, can be created by a federal law extending the Indian 
liquor laws to a particular piece of land. For Alaska Native Villages, the 
 
 275.  See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 734 (1983). 
 276.  Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533, 534. 
 277.  Id. 
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Seveloff fix legislation, enacted in 1873 and not subsequently repealed, 
should provide that prerequisite. It did not make the lands occupied by 
Alaska Native Villages “full” Indian country, so it does not require any 
reconsideration of the Venetie ruling; instead, it had the effect of making 
those lands a limited type of “Indian country” for purposes of the Indian 
liquor laws only. This may be of considerable benefit, not only to those 
Alaska Native Villages wishing to exercise their authority to prevent, 
through village ordinances and village enforcement, the myriad 
problems which alcohol abuse has visited on their children and families, 
but also to the State of Alaska which finds itself spending untold 
amounts to remedy the problems created thereby.  
IV. TODAY: CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNCILS 
First and foremost, it is important to recognize that the existence of 
tribal authority over liquor does not equate to a diminution of state 
authority. Under the statutes enacted by Congress in 1953, liquor 
transactions have to comply with both state law and tribal ordinances, 
so the State continues to be able to enforce every aspect of state law. Rice 
v. Rehner forecloses any argument that a liquor dealer could try to “hide 
behind” a tribal ordinance as authorizing a liquor transaction 
notwithstanding a state law prohibiting that transaction. Tribal 
ordinances cannot exempt liquor transactions from state law (and vice 
versa).  
Second, it would likely be a mistake for tribal authorities to rely too 
much on the possibility of federal criminal prosecutions as an 
enforcement mechanism. History amply demonstrates that the federal 
government is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to make this 
happen. The practical advice Felix Cohen offered in 1941278 remains true: 
tribes would be well-advised to fashion remedies that they can 
implement themselves. The statute allows federal prosecutions for 
violations of tribal ordinances only if those ordinances have been 
published in the Federal Register, and there is no guarantee that the 
Interior Department will be persuaded to publish. Even then, federal 
prosecution may be able to play a backup role, but not a primary one. 
Third, tribal ordinances need to adhere to the Indian Civil Rights 
Act’s requirements.279 Due process requires notice and the opportunity 
for a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. Equal protection 
 
 278.  See Re the Intoxicating Liquor Traffic Among Natives in Alaska, supra 
note 240. 
 279.  25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
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prohibits discrimination against particular groups.280 Tribes cannot 
“violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue 
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized.”281 
Fourth, Alaska Native Villages arguably have the authority under 
section 20 of the 1834 Act “to take and destroy any ardent spirits or wine 
found in the Indian country.”282 This was the tradition in many Alaska 
Native Villages for years.283 It may still be the simplest and most 
straightforward enforcement mechanism for Alaska’s Native Villages to 
use. Tribal searches and seizures, while not subject to the provisions of 
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, are, as noted above, 
subject to the parallel provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.284 But 
tribal courts could issue those warrants, and a tribal government 
exercising this authority would have the shield of its sovereign 
immunity to protect it from attacks on those enforcement actions. 
 Fifth, criminal prosecution may not be a realistic enforcement 
option for Alaska Native Villages to undertake on their own. Criminal 
proceedings trigger an additional panoply of procedures and rights 
under the Indian Civil Rights Act, which may make such proceedings 
overly cumbersome and cost-ineffective for the tribe.285 Absent 
Congressional authorization, it is black-letter law that tribes cannot 
 
 280.  The equal protection clause would presumably allow the tribe to 
distinguish between its members and non-members, see generally Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), but in this context, it would probably take the form 
of allowing certain remedies against members violating the ordinance that 
would not be available for imposition on non-members violating the ordinance. 
 281.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2), (a)(8). 
 282.  18 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012) (“Any . . . Indian may take and destroy any 
ardent spirits or wine found in the Indian country, except such as are kept or 
used for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes or such as 
may be introduced therein by the Department of the Army”). 
 283.  See Pat Hanley, Warrantless Searches for Alcohol by Native Alaskan Villages: 
A Permissible Exercise of Sovereign Rights or an Assault on Civil Liberties?, 14 
ALASKA L. REV. 471, 472 (1997) (“Several [Native American Villages] in 
southwestern Alaska have set up stations at the village airplane runway in order 
to search people and their luggage for alcohol before they are permitted to enter 
their village”); ICHS study, supra note 1, at 68–69 (“Characteristics of continuous 
law making and enforcement in these communities include some of the 
following: . . . Illegal search, seizure, and destruction of alcohol from private 
homes based on observed and reported possession and use . . . Some of the 
means used by these communities are legitimized by community consensus, but 
may be illegal because they violate the constitutional rights of residents.”). 
 284.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2). 
 285.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3), (4), (6), (7), (10). 
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subject non-Natives to criminal prosecution,286 and in those instances 
where Congress authorizes tribal criminal proceedings against non-
Natives, there tend to be more rigorous safeguards and costly 
prerequisites, perhaps unrealistic at present for many villages.287 
Criminal jurisdiction is more likely to lead to jurisdictional challenges, 
including the possibility of a federal habeas corpus action.288 Criminal 
proceedings will probably be better left up to the discretion of state 
prosecutors for violation of state law and federal prosecutors under the 
federal Indian liquor laws. Civil remedies should be available with 
respect to non-tribal members, given the clear threat that alcohol 
presents to village health and welfare.289 Civil remedies may encompass 
several types of remedies that may prove efficacious, including 
forfeiture and/or destruction of alcohol, civil monetary penalties, 
imposition of security bonds or other conditions to insure future 
compliance, and civil exclusion remedies.  
Sixth, tribal ordinances should be drafted to apply to well-defined 
and limited geographic areas in the vicinity of the village being 
protected. The federal Indian liquor laws were extended to Alaska “so 
far as the same may be applicable thereto,”290 indicating Congress 
intended there be some discretion, and some responsibility, to interpret 
the law with a rule of reason. Villages should be careful not to overstep 
their authority. Ordinances should protect the village area, and Councils 
in drafting their ordinances will necessarily make choices about defining 
that area, but they should be careful to tailor that scope to be no broader 
than reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose. Tribal attempts to 
regulate liquor sales in Anchorage or Fairbanks would exceed this limit 
of reasonableness.  
Seventh, Councils should understand the similarities and 
distinctions between tribal ordinances and local option ordinances. Each 
will be independently enforceable. Villages need not choose one over the 
other; both may be in place in the same area, and then any liquor 
transaction will have to remain in compliance with both sets of rules. For 
some villages, if the local option ordinance is working well, there may 
be no need to assert tribal authority. Other villages have found the local 
option ordinances to be unsatisfactory for one reason or another.291 But 
 
 286.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 287.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012). 
 288.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012). 
 289.  The Supreme Court has noted that the distribution and use of 
intoxicants are clearly matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal 
life. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
 290.  See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 291.  The shortcomings most often mentioned about Alaska’s local option 
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the assertion of tribal authority need not entail rejecting the local option 
ordinance. The two should be able to work together, and perhaps any 
weak points in either can be ameliorated by the other.  
CONCLUSION 
The 1873 Seveloff fix extension of the Indian liquor laws to Alaska 
was not repealed by Congress–-not by enactment of the Revised Statutes 
in 1876, or the District Organic Act in 1884, or by the Carter Code in 
1899, or by the Territorial Organic Act in 1912, or by the Bone Dry Law 
in 1917, or by Assistant Commissioner Kirgis in 1937, or by the 
amendments to the federal criminal code in 1948 or 1949, or by the 
revision of the FILL in 1953, or the extension of P.L. 280 to Alaska in 
1953, or by Statehood in 1959, or by ANCSA in 1971, or by the Venetie 
decision in 1998. Unless and until Congress chooses to repeal it, it can 
serve to provide Alaska Native Villages with a proper basis to exercise 
the same sort of federally-delegated authority to regulate alcohol in their 
immediate vicinities that their counterparts in the lower 48 have within 
their reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities. The 
federal, state and tribal governments should make use of the fact that 
every federally recognized tribe in Alaska occupies a community to 
which Congress extended the Indian liquor laws in 1873, giving each 
village sufficient basis to enact tribal alcohol ordinances pursuant to the 
federally-delegated authority Congress enacted in 1953. 
 
ordinances include: some villages would like more flexibility than is afforded by 
the limited menu of possible provisions to be included in the ordinance under 
ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.491(b) (2012); some villages may wish to sanction 
“possession by consumption” as well as possession in a container, compare 
ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.501(d) (2012); some villages may wish to fashion their own 
sanctions more aligned with their own village traditions; some villages have 
concerns over the state penalties under the local option law, and/or wish to 
impose a sanction without the offender getting a state court criminal record; 
some villages want to implement timelier responses than state law enforcement 
is able to supply. (Interview with Tanana Chiefs Conference Tribal Government 
Specialist Lisa Jaeger, Mar. 14, 2015). In some areas, local option elections seem 
to swing back and forth with a frequency that generates significant confusion. 
See ICHS study, supra note 1, at 71. 
None of this is to say that the local option ordinances are unhelpful. There 
are many Alaskan children and Alaskan families that have benefitted from the 
safer and healthier living environment in a community without alcohol. 
“Although growing evidence suggests that the local option law may reduce 
adverse effects of alcohol abuse in Alaska Native communities, its most 
important contribution may be to restore to these communities a limited form of 
self-government.” Matthew Berman & Teresa Hull, Alcohol Control by Referendum 
in Northern Native Communities: the Alaska Local Option Law 1, 2, U. OF ALASKA 
ANCHORAGE INST. OF SOC. AND ECON. RESEARCH, Aug. 2000, available at 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/Alcohol_Arctic.pdf. 
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Justice Thomas’s closing observation in the Venetie opinion that 
“[w]hether the concept of Indian country should be modified is a 
question entirely for Congress”292 unconsciously echoed the observation 
made by Judge Matthew Deady over 100 years earlier that “[i]f congress 
should think it desirable that this or any other provision of the Indian 
intercourse act should be in force in Alaska, it can so provide, beyond 
doubt.”293 Congress did so provide, and Judge Deady, to his credit, 
recognized that it had. Hopefully, contemporary courts will recognize 
the significance of this unrepealed provision as a legal foundation from 
which the State of Alaska and its resident Tribes can collaboratively 
exercise their shared delegated jurisdiction. A strong village 
enforcement stance against illegal alcohol importation could be a 
valuable ally with, and effective supplement to, strong state enforcement 
of state and local option laws. The State of Alaska, for all of its resistance 
to tribal self-rule policies in other contexts, has not attacked tribal efforts 
to regulate alcohol. That tradition is one that ought to be maintained.294 
 
 292.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998). 
 293. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252). 
 294. See United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 198 
(1876) (“Minnesota, instead of being injured, is benefited. An immense tract of 
valuable country formerly withheld from her civil jurisdiction is subjected to it, 
and her wealth and power greatly increased. . . . It would seem, apart from the 
question of power, that the price paid by the State bears no proportion to the 
substantial and enduring benefits conferred upon her; and we are happy to say, 
that her officers are not engaged in making this defence [sic].”). 
